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I.
Introduction
With the increase of globalization and international business
transactions, forum selection clauses have never played a more
important role in cross-border litigation than they do today. Often
mistaken as simply boilerplate provisions in a contract, forum
selection clauses—or jurisdiction clauses,1 as they are often called
in civil law countries—can be the clincher in cross-border disputes.
Such clauses, whether directly or indirectly, can, for example,
determine whether a party to an international contract will have to
spend millions of dollars litigating a dispute in a foreign country.
They can also determine whether a party will be entitled to certain
types of damages which may be permissible in one country and
precluded in another, or whether a party’s claim will be heard at all
in situations where one country may allow claims that another does
not or where a claim is precluded by a statute of limitations in one
country but not in another.
When a court is met with a forum selection clause, the
discussion generally focuses on two issues: (1) whether the clause
is enforceable and (2) how the clause should be interpreted. The
issues of enforceability and interpretation are often interrelated. For
example, what a court interprets a forum selection clause to actually
mean can determine whether or not the court will ultimately enforce
the clause. Historically, courts in some countries may have been
hesitant to enforce forum selection clauses. Today, however, there
is a consensus among many countries that the intent of the parties
to an agreement should be upheld wherever possible and, to that
end, forum selection clauses should by default be enforced. As a
result, a court’s analysis of a forum selection clause is generally
structured to answer the question: why should the clause not be

1 The term “forum selection clause” and “jurisdiction clause” will be used
interchangeably throughout this paper; however, where possible, reference will be made
to the term used in the relevant jurisdiction or court.
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enforced? However, the doctrines and tests that each court applies
to determine when such clauses should not be enforced differ across
national borders.
To answer this question of why a forum selection clause should
not be enforced, courts inevitably—whether they realize or
acknowledge it or not—are required to engage in some sort of
interpretation of the clause. By way of example, a court could be
met with the following jurisdiction clause: “The parties agree that
all proceedings arising out of or in connection with any dispute
concerning this Agreement . . . shall only be . . . determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction in British Columbia.”2 In deciding
whether to enforce this clause, a court may first have to decide, per
the wording of the clause, whether the forum chosen by the parties
is the exclusive forum for disputes arising out of the agreement.3
Separately, a court may also have to decide whether the dispute
before it “arises out of” or is “in connection with” the agreement
and thereby fits into the scope of the clause. Further, if one of the
parties to the dispute was not a party to the agreement, a court may
have to decide whether that party can seek to enforce the clause or,
in other words, whether the clause applies to third parties.4
For the most part, these three interpretive questions are
questions of law for a court, as opposed to questions of fact.5 Given
2 Civil Ag Grp., Inc. v. Octaform Sys., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1114 (D. Minn.
2017) (example forum selection clause).
3 An alternative to a forum selection clause being exclusive is that the parties simply
consented to jurisdiction in the forum mentioned in the clause while not excluding the
possibility of other forums.
4 As evident by the case examples provided in this paper, these three interpretive
issues are the main issues courts are concerned with when interpreting the meaning of a
forum selection clause. While these three issues are the main issues, they certainly are not
the only issues. Another issue that commonly arises (particularly in the United States) is
whether a forum selection clause requires parties to litigate in a state or provincial court
versus federal court. For example, the sample clause discussed from the case Civil Ag
Grp., Inc. v. Octaform Sys., Inc. simply states “a court of competent jurisdiction is British
Columbia.” As a result, it is not clear whether the clause requires the parties to litigate in
the Provincial Court of British Columbia or in a federal court such as the Canada Federal
Court in Vancouver. Arguably, for the purpose of forum shopping, it is not uncommon
for parties to try to argue that a clause, taken together with other aspects of the agreement
and the relationship between the parties, requires disputes to be litigated in federal courts
rather than state courts, or vice versa.
5 It is certainly possible that in some cases these interpretive issues will be questions
of fact for a court and the court will be required to look at previous discussions between
the parties or other components of the relationship between the parties to determine what
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the court must apply law to answer such interpretive questions, an
issue that can arise before the court is what law should be applied to
answer these interpretive questions.
More specifically, in
interpreting forum selection clauses, should the court apply the law
of the jurisdiction in which it sits (the law of the forum) or apply the
law chosen by the parties to govern their agreement? How courts
in different countries approach this narrow question—or whether
courts in such countries address the issue at all—is the focal point
of this paper.
This paper outlines how the law and courts in many of the major
English- and German-speaking nations interpret forum selection
clauses. The countries surveyed include Germany, Austria, the
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, and the United
States. A survey of these countries demonstrates differences
between civil law and common law jurisdictions, countries that are
Member States of the European Union and countries that are not in
the European Union, and between countries that have complex
codified rules on conflict of laws and countries that rely solely on
case law doctrine. The paper is structured to first summarize how
the law and courts of each country handle the interpretation of
forum selection clauses, beginning with an outline of any relevant
legislation or governing case law. It then provides a series of case
examples.6 The case examples demonstrate what can be thought of
as three levels of analysis a court can engage in when interpreting a
forum selection clause: (1) the enforceability of the clause; (2)

the intent of the parties actually was. However, it is more often the case that parties have
included what is known as a merger clause (also referred to as an integration clause or
entire agreement clause), which declares the written contract to be the final and complete
agreement between the parties, and ideally precludes a court from considering extrinsic
evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Common law courts may also follow what
is known as the parol evidence rule, which effectuates the purpose of a merger clause and
prevents the court from looking outside the agreement. For more on the basics of merger
clauses, see generally ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.8
(2015).
6 While the paper will focus on the interpretation of forum selection clauses, the
relevancy of the previously discussed enforceability issues will be apparent in
interpretation analyses and will consequently be interwoven throughout the paper. In fact,
as the case examples will show, many courts simply blur the issues of enforceability and
interpretation of forum selection clauses together into one overall analysis. For more on
the enforceability of forum selection clauses, see generally Matthew J. Sorensen,
Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court After Atlantic Marine, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2014).
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which law governs interpretation of the clause; and (3) actual
interpretation of the clause. The case examples show that some
courts dip into all three levels of analysis in their discussion of a
forum selection clause, while other courts limit their analysis to
enforceability issues. As a result, the courts that adopt the latter
approach do not actually interpret the forum selection clause at all.
In fact, the question of what law applies to the interpretation of a
forum selection clause is an issue that can simply be ignored by
some courts, or, alternatively, acknowledged but passed over so the
court can reach its desired outcome. The paper concludes with a
number of survey observations, including a list of factors which,
based on the survey results, may be included in a nation’s approach
to the interpretation of forum selection clauses.
II. The European Union
As a supranational organization consisting of 28 Member States
with 24 different languages, the government of the European Union
is, for obvious reasons, familiar with cross-border litigation issues.
Among these issues are forum selection clauses—often referred to
as jurisdiction clauses in European jurisdictions—and the role that
such clauses play in international litigation.
To summarize the law in any country that is a member of the
European Union, it is first essential to consider EU law. The
authority of the European Union as an organization and the
authority of its individual institutions derives from two main
treaties: the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)7 and the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).8 Under these
treaties, two EU institutions, the Council and the European
Parliament, have authority to, among other things, exercise
legislative functions for the European Union.9 Legislation is
primarily adopted through two types of acts in the European Union:
regulations and directives.10 Regulations have general application

7 See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2016 O.J.
(C 202) 1 [hereinafter TEU].
8 See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1 [hereinafter TFEU].
9 TEU, supra note 7, art. 16; TFEU, supra note 8, art. 289.
10 See generally KAREN DAVIES, UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION LAW, ch. 4 (5th
ed. 2013) (explaining that the European Union issues other legal acts, called secondary
legislation, including decisions, recommendations, and opinions).
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and are binding and directly applicable to EU Member States, which
gives them direct and immediate force in the laws of the Member
States.11 Directives are also binding “as to the result to be
achieved[,]” but they must be transposed into the national law of the
EU member states by the governments of the Member States. The
Member States retain authority over the form and methods of the
legislation, but the law must facilitate the result the directive aimed
to achieve.12
The EU institutions also have the authority to conclude
international agreements on behalf of the Member States.13 While
the authority of the European Union is limited in terms of what
exactly the supranational organization can adopt legislation on, that
authority is relatively broad in that it includes all matters within the
scope of the objectives of the European Union, which are listed and
discussed in depth in the TEU and TFEU. Essentially, under this
authority provided to the European Union by the treaties, EU law
has a two-fold effect on law in EU Member States through
mechanisms known as positive and negative integration.14 Positive
integration refers to the ability of the European Union to adopt
measures that establish common standards throughout the European
Union.15 Negative integration allows the European Union to
suppress national law of any Member State that violates the
common standards adopted by the European Union.16
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the European Union has developed
considerable legislation concerning the area known as private
international law (commonly referred to as “conflict of laws” in
common law countries). This legislation includes rules related to
how courts in EU Member States are required to address disputes
between parties when the parties have agreed to a forum selection
and/or choice-of-law clause. This section will describe the main
pieces of legislation that guide such issues under EU law, in addition

TFEU, supra note 8, art. 288.
Id.
13 Id. at art. 216.
14 See Jan-Jaap Kuipers, European Union and Private International Law, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017). The
terms positive integration and negative integration are also sometimes referred to as
positive harmonization and negative harmonization, respectively.
15 Id.
16 Id.
11
12
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to the current state of relevant law in three sovereign states in the
European Union: Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom.
A. The Basics on EU Private International Law
In the European Union and in many civil law countries, the
enforcement and interpretation of a forum selection clause falls
under
the
general
field
known
as
private
international law. The European Union has established a network
of rules regarding private international law through a number of
regulations, which are typically binding on all EU Member States.17
This section will summarize and outline the most relevant
regulations in the current EU framework on private international
law: The Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation.18
1. The Brussels I Regulation
EU law governing private international law issues regarding
jurisdiction clauses is primarily regulated by what is known as the
“Brussels Regime.”19 The current regulation underlying the
17 EU regulations are not always binding on all member states due to special
arrangements that certain member states, such as Denmark, have with the European Union.
However, despite not being required to do so, these countries often also adopt EU
regulations.
18 The European Union has issued many other regulations and protocols that address
more specific private international law issues including, for example, the Brussels II
Regulation and the Rome II and Rome III Regulations, which govern issues related to the
forum and law applicable to non-contractual obligations and to divorce and legal
separation, respectively. There are also regulations, Brussels IV and Rome IV, which
govern private international law as it relates to succession. Depending on the type of
agreement and the law chosen by the parties, these regulations may also be helpful for
understanding the scope of a forum selection clause if the law chosen by the parties is the
law of an E.U. Member State. However, this paper has limited the discussion of EU private
international law regulations to the Brussels I Regulation and Rome I Regulation, which
will govern forum selection clauses in the majority of international business contracts, like
the type of contracts at issue in many of the cases discussed here.
19 The term “Brussels Regime” historically may refer to the predecessors of the
current regulation including Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters, which was previously called the “Brussels I Regulation.” It may also refer to the
Brussels convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, which is commonly referred to as the “Brussels
Convention.” For a more detailed discussion of the historical development of private
international law in the European Union, see Burkhard Hess & Vincent Richard, Brussels
I (Convention and Regulation), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017).
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Brussels Regime is the re-casted Brussels I Regulation.20 One of
the most important functions of the regulation is to lay out the basic
private international law rules for EU Member States on
jurisdiction.21 Such rules are divided between general and special
jurisdiction rules, and further divided into separate sections for
certain areas of law including insurance, consumer contracts,
employment contracts, and special matters that require exclusive
jurisdiction rules such as matters in rem.22
Under Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation, jurisdiction
clauses selecting an EU Member State are generally to be upheld by
other EU Member States unless the agreement between the parties
regarding jurisdiction is “null and void as to its substantive validity
under the law of that Member State.”23 Further clarification of the
wording from Article 25 is provided in the recitals to the
20 Parliament and Council Regulation 1215/2012, On Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast),
2012 O.J. (L 351/1) [hereinafter Recast Brussels I Regulation]. This regulation may be
referred to as the “Recast Brussels I Regulation,” the “Brussels I Regulation,” or even
“Brussels IA Regulation.” It is commonly referred to as the “EuGVVO” or “EuGVO” or
“EuGVÜ” in German-speaking countries. The same term can be applied to refer to all of
the Brussels regulations. This paper will refer to this current version of the regulation in
text as the “Brussels I Regulation.” The regulation was adopted in 2012, entered into force
on 10 January, 2015, and is now binding on all Member States of the European Union. At
its inception, the regulation was not binding on Denmark, which opted out of the regulation
on 20 December, 2012. However, Denmark later implemented the regulation as it applies
to relations between the European Union and Denmark by Danish Law No. 518 of 18 May
2012, which entered into force on 1 June, 2013. See European Commission, National
Information and Online Forms Concerning Regulation No. 1215/2012, EUROPEAN EJUSTICE (Nov. 20, 2017), https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast350-en.do [https://perma.cc/CA7C-7MGG].
21 As indicated by the title, the regulation also provides rules on the recognition and
enforcement of judgements, which will not be discussed in this paper.
22 The conflict of law rules included in the Brussels I Regulation constitute the
majority of the jurisdiction-related parts of the Regulation. The general jurisdiction
provisions are provided for in Articles 4–6. Special jurisdiction rules are provided for in
Articles 7–9. Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance is discussed in Articles 10–16.
Consumer contracts are discussed in Articles 17–19. Employment contracts are discussed
in Articles 20–23. Finally, special matters for which exclusive jurisdiction is provided for
under the Regulation are discussed in Article 24.
23 Recast Brussels I Regulation, supra note 20, at art. 25(1) (“If the parties, regardless
of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have
jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with
a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction unless the
agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member
State.”).
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Regulation.24 Recital 20 of the Regulation states:
Where a question arises as to whether a choice-of-court agreement in
favour of a court or the courts of a Member State is null and void as to
its substantive validity, that question should be decided in accordance
with the law of the Member State of the court or courts designated in the
agreement, including the conflict-of-laws rules of that Member State.25

In addition to this general preference for enforcement, the
Regulation states that forum selection clauses “shall be treated as an
agreement independent of the other terms of the contract” and that
the validity of a jurisdiction clause “cannot be contested solely on
the ground that the contract is not valid.”26 Article 25(1) also
provides for a presumption of exclusivity for such clauses by stating
that the jurisdiction under a jurisdiction clause “shall be exclusive
unless the parties have agreed otherwise.”27
In addition, the Brussels I Regulation also contains provisions
which govern how courts of EU Member States should procedurally
handle disputes to avoid parallel proceedings being held in multiple
jurisdictions.28 The Brussels I Regulation also introduced lis
pendens, or “pending litigation” rules. These rules give preference
to the court of an EU Member State which was the “court first
seised” by requiring any other EU Member State court to stay any
action before it until the first court establishes whether or not it has
jurisdiction.29 With specific regard to jurisdiction clauses, Article
31(2) allows a court of a Member State which is not in the forum

24 It should be noted that recitals and preambles in E.U. instruments and legislation
have no binding or autonomous effect. Recitals operate as “interpretive tools” in EU
legislation, meaning they can help to explain the purpose and intent behind the legislation.
They are considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU” or “ECJ”) in
a limited capacity, often only being taken into account to resolve ambiguities in the
legislation. See Case C-162/97, Nilsson & Others, 1998 E.C.R. I-7477, ¶ 54; see also
Roberto Baratta, Complexity of EU Law in the Domestic Implementing Process, 2 THEORY
& Prac. Legis. 293 (2014).
25 Recast Brussels I Regulation, supra note 20, at recital 20.
26 Id. at art. 25(4–5).
27 Id. at art. 25(1).
28 Id. at art. 8, 9. For example, if one Member State has exclusive jurisdiction under
Article 24 of the Regulation, Article 27 requires a court in any other Member State to
declare by its own motion that it has no jurisdiction over the claim. Id. art. 24, 27.
29 Id. at art. 29(1).
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chosen by the parties in their jurisdiction clause to stay any
proceedings brought before it if proceedings are also brought before
the court which was conferred exclusive jurisdiction under the
jurisdiction clause “until such time as the court seised on the basis
of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the
agreement.”30 However, while the lis pendens rules allow the court
to stay such proceedings based on the jurisdiction clause, it does not
require the court to do so.
2. The Rome I Regulation
The second regulation that makes up the core of EU private
international law rules relevant to this paper is the Rome I
Regulation.31 While the Brussels I Regulation, among other things,
discusses the enforcement of jurisdiction clauses and related issues,
the Rome I Regulation governs choice-of-law issues in the
European Union. The Regulation discusses the effect of contractual
choice-of-law clauses and establishes default rules in the absence of
a choice-of-law agreement. Article 3(1) of the regulation generally
states, “[a] contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the
parties.”32 Article 12 of the Regulation governs the scope of the
applicable law and notably states that the law chosen by the parties
particularly governs, among other things: (1) interpretation issues;
(2) performance issues; (3) the various ways of extinguishing
obligations, and prescription and limitation of actions; and (4) the
consequences of nullity of the contract.33 However, the Regulation
does contain limitations to these rules. Under Article 3, the choice
of law by the parties must not be enforced “where all other elements
relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in a
country other than the country whose law has been chosen,” or
where EU law cannot be preempted by agreement.34 Further, the
Regulation includes a public policy exception under Article 21.35
Id. at art. 31(2).
See generally Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 2008 O.J. (L
177) 6 [hereinafter Rome I Regulation].
32 Id. at art. 3(1).
33 Id. at art. 12(1)(a–b, d–e).
34 Id. at art. 3(3–4).
35 Id. at art. 21 (“The application of a provision of the law of any country specified
by this Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with
the public policy (ordre public) of the forum.”).
30
31
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Unlike in the Brussels I Regulation, Rome I provides for
“universal application,” meaning the law chosen by the parties
“shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State.”36
However, this universal application requirement is still arguably
limited with respect to the interpretation of forum selection clauses
due to the limited application and discretionary rules of the Brussels
I Regulation. Case examples from the EU countries discussed
below show how courts faced with the interpretation of a forum
selection clause under a contract that selects a non-EU court and
non-EU law only sometimes discuss the application of Rome I, and
other times leave both Rome I and Brussels I aside. Theoretically,
under the black letter law of the Regulations, a court in an EU
country applying Rome I based on the universal applicability
provision in the Regulation could find that under Article 12 of Rome
I, a forum selection clause must be interpreted by the law chosen by
the parties and any discretion of the court under Brussels I is limited
to enforcement issues. Yet, case examples show it is not clear that
courts in EU Member States always find such a connection between
the Rome I and Brussels I Regulations. Instead, they sometimes
lean on the discretionary enforcement provisions in the Brussels I
Regulation when having to interpret the meaning of a forum
selection clause.
3. The Lugano Convention
International treaties to which the European Union is a party
also play a role in EU private international law. The most notable
of such treaties is the Lugano Convention.37 The Lugano
Convention is a treaty between the European Community, the
Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, the Kingdom of
Norway, and the Swiss Confederation.38
Id. at art. 2.
The full name of the convention is the Lugano Convention of 30 October 2007 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 2007 O.J. (L 339) 3 [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
38 Lugano Convention 2007, SCHWEIZERISCHE EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT (Jun. 9, 2011),
https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/wirtschaft/privatrecht/lugue-2007.html
[https://perma.cc/5LDZ-EKNB]. The Convention entered into force in the European
Union, Denmark, and Norway on 1 January, 2010, in Switzerland on 1 January, 2011, and
in Iceland on 1 May, 2011. Id. The 2007 convention replaced the previously enacted
Lugano Convention of 1988, which was a convention that was designed to work parallel
with the original Brussels Convention from 1968. The revision of the Lugano Convention
was undertaken simultaneously with revising the Brussels Convention, with the overall
36
37
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Like the Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention also
generally requires the enforcement of jurisdiction clauses between
parties to the convention. Under Article 23(1) of the convention, if
parties agreed “that a court or the courts of a State bound by [the]
Convention are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which
have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal
relationship,” and at least one party of the dispute is domiciled in a
State bound by the convention, the agreement between the parties
should be upheld.39 While this part of Article 23 only applies to
countries who are parties to the Convention, Article 23(3) provides
a preference to the jurisdiction chosen by parties who are not
domiciled in a state bound by the Convention. It does this by not
allowing courts of states bound by the Convention to establish
jurisdiction over a matter under a jurisdiction clause pointing to a
court in a non-party state, unless the chosen court(s) have declined
jurisdiction.40 As in the Brussels I Regulation, Article 23 also states
that a jurisdiction clause is presumed to be exclusive unless the
parties agreed otherwise.41 Further mirroring the Brussels I
Regulation, the Lugano Convention also provides certain
exceptions to enforcing a jurisdiction clause in matters related to
insurance, employment, rights in rem, and consumers.42 Uniquely,
the Lugano Convention also contains an article under which a party
has a right to bring a claim in a jurisdiction other than the
jurisdiction agreed to by the parties in a jurisdiction clause if the
jurisdiction agreement was concluded for the benefit of only one
party.43
4. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
The European Union is also a ratifying party to the Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (the “Convention”).44
goal of harmonizing the two conventions. See generally Professor Fausto Pocar,
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 2009 O.J. (C 319) 1 (2009).
39 Lugano Convention, supra note 37, at art. 23(1).
40 Id. at art. 23(3).
41 Id.
42 Id. at art. 13, 17, 21–22.
43 Id. at art. 17(3).
44 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98
[https://perma.cc/C2SS-H27Y] [hereinafter Hague Convention]. Denmark is excepted
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While the applicability of the Convention is limited given the small
number of countries that have ratified it, the Convention should still
be considered in the European Union’s private international law
scheme.45 The Convention attempts to establish “uniform rules on
jurisdiction and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in civil and commercial matters” between contracting
states.46 Article 5 of the Convention provides that a forum selection
clause designating the court(s) of a contracting state should have
jurisdiction is enforceable unless the clause is null and void under
the law of that contracting state.47 Article 5 also requires the
contracting state designated in a choice-of-court agreement to
accept jurisdiction.48 Under Article 5, the Convention is effectively
limited in that, similar to the Brussels I Regulation, it is only
applicable when: (1) the forum interpreting the jurisdiction clause
is a contracting party to the Convention; and (2) the jurisdiction
clause selects courts in a country that is a party to the Convention.
5. Summary Remarks
These four instruments—the Brussels I Regulation, Rome I
Regulation, Lugano Convention, and the Hague Choice of Court
Agreement—are at the center of many cases before courts in EU
Member States which concern the interpretation of forum selection
clauses. Theoretically, where a court in an EU Member State is
required to interpret a forum selection clause that designates
jurisdiction to be in the courts of another EU Member State or
country bound by the Lugano Convention, Article 12 of Rome I
requires the court to refer to the law chosen by the parties for
from the European Union’s ratification of the Convention. See Status Table for the
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HCCH (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98
[https://perma.cc/LN6L-9VP8] [hereinafter Status Table].
45 The Convention was concluded in 2005 and, at this point, has been ratified by only
Mexico, Singapore, and the European Union. While the Convention has also been signed
by China, Montenegro, Ukraine, and the United States, these countries have not yet ratified
the Convention and as a result the Convention remains inapplicable to these countries.
Status Table, supra note 44.
46 Hague Convention, supra note 44, at Preamble.
47 Id. at art. 5(1).
48 Under Article 5, a state chosen in a choice-of-court clause is prevented from
declining jurisdiction based on finding—for example, as courts in the United States often
find under the doctrine of forum non conveniens—that the dispute should be heard in
another court. Id. at art. 5(2).
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resolving interpretation issues. However, the rules established by
these regulations are limited in that the Brussels I Regulation and
the Lugano Convention do not directly apply to cases when the
forum selection clause designates a non-EU country to have
jurisdiction over the dispute. In such cases, EU Member States have
to turn to their own private international law rules. Further, the
Brussels I Regulation provides the court with a great deal of
discretion under its procedural rules and does not require it to stay
a case due to the existence of a forum selection clause. This makes
predicting how a court in an EU Member State will interpret forum
selection clauses very difficult. Thus, despite the universal
application of Rome I, the effect of these three regulations working
together is ultimately weakened by the limitations of the other three
instruments.
B. EU Member State Reports
This section will outline how three Member States of the
European Union—Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom—
address the enforcement and interpretation of jurisdiction clauses.
A comparison of these three Member States highlights the
differences in civil law systems (Austria and Germany) and
common law systems (the United Kingdom). It also explores
differences among civil law systems between countries which
imbed private international law rules in their national law
(Germany) and countries which separate private international law
into an individual act of legislation within their national law
(Austria).
1. Germany49
Germany is a federal republic consisting of sixteen federal states
(“Bundesländer”).50 The court system is structured mainly within
the federal states, with the exception of the highest federal courts
where matters from the states can ultimately be appealed to.51 With
49 Research on German law and cases was primarily conducted using the databases
Beck-online: die Datenbank and Juris-das Rechtsportal. Any translations, unless
otherwise noted, were completed by the author of this paper.
50 Judicial Systems in Member States – Germany, EUROPEAN E-JUSTICE (Feb. 20,
2013), https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_judicial_systems_in_member_states-16-deen.do?member=1 [https://perma.cc/8KDH-7CPV] [hereinafter Judicial Systems –
Germany].
51 Id.
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regard to court hierarchy, within each federal state there are local
courts (Amtsgerichte) and regional courts (Landesgerichte).
Depending on the value of the matter, either the local courts or
regional courts will have original jurisdiction over a matter.52 The
regional courts sometimes also have appellate jurisdiction over
judgments appealed from the local courts.53 The federal states also
have higher regional courts (Oberlandesgerichte), which hear
appeals against original judgments from regional courts.54 Finally,
there are courts at the central federal level, those which serve as
appellate courts of last instance for issues of law from the lower
courts, and the highest federal court (the Bundesgerichtshof or
“BGH”).55 The court system is also structured into six specific
branches of specialized subject-matter jurisdictions, including
ordinary jurisdiction (which includes civil and criminal matters),
constitutional jurisdiction, labor jurisdiction, general administrative
jurisdiction, fiscal jurisdiction, and social jurisdiction.56 The court
a case should be brought before depends on which court has subjectmatter jurisdiction within these six categories.57 The higher federal
courts, which hear appeals, are also organized into these categories.
As German law is a civil law system, case law does not have the
binding force that it does in common law systems. However, where
the civil law does not address certain specific private international
law issues, judicial interpretation does play an important role. In
some ways, German judges also often play a more active role than
judges in common law systems. As put by one scholar, “German
judges see themselves as partners in an ongoing dialogue between
52 See The Courts of Law in the Federal Republic of Germany,
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (2005)
http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/courts_of_law.pdf?__blob=publication
File&v=3 [https://perma.cc/96XU-GJVW]. Local courts have original jurisdiction over
claims up to a value of 5,000 Euro and regional courts have original jurisdiction over
claims with a value exceeding 5,000 Euro.
53 Id. To appeal a judgment from the local court to the regional court, the value of
the claim must exceed 600 Euro. Both issues of fact and law may be appealed to the
regional court.
54 Id. The higher regional court has appellate jurisdiction over issues of fact or law
from the regional courts.
55 Id.
56 Judicial Systems – Germany, supra note 50.
57 For example, if the case is a labor law case, the case will be brought before the
proper labor court within the federal state, often before the lowest local or regional court
depending on the value of the dispute.
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practitioners and academic writers, aimed at finding adequate
solutions to legal problems.”58
a. Summary of Relevant Law
The regulation of private international law in countries in the
European Union like Germany stems first and foremost from the EU
law discussed above. Given the amount of EU legislation on private
international law, German private international law immediately
points out the primacy of EU law in Article 3(1) of the Introductory
Act to the Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuche, or “EGBGB”).59 Under Article 3(2) of the EGBGB,
private international law rules that are directly applicable in national
law under international conventions or treaties also take precedence
over German national law.60 If the private international law rules
under EU law or another international convention or treaty cannot
solve an issue in a particular case, German courts will apply German
private international law rules.61 These rules are primarily found in
the EGBGB; however, there are also private international law rules
relating to specific types of cases found elsewhere in German law.62
With regard to choice-of-law clauses, Germany in general
applies the principle, whether under the Rome I Regulation or under
its own private international law, that the law chosen by the parties
governs a contract.63 The choice of law must however be clearly
expressed or determinable with reasonable certainty by the
circumstances of a case.64 Further, the rights of third parties in non-

58 Jan von Hein, Germany, 2101, 2103 in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter Hein, Germany].
59 EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ
ZUM
BÜRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCHE
[EGBGB]
[INTRODUCTORY ACT TO THE CIVIL CODE], §1, art. 3(1), translation at https://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_bgbeg/englisch_bgbeg.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KVW-HNUT]
[hereinafter EGBGB] (Ger.).
60 Id. at §1, art. 3(2). This would include, for example, private international law rules
under the United Nations Convention of 11 April 1980 on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG). Hein, Germany, supra note 58, at 2102.
61 EGBGB, supra note 59; see also Hein, Germany, supra note 58.
62 Many of the conflict of law rules in German law came directly from the Rome I
Regulation. Articles 1 through 21 of Rome I were implemented into Articles 27 to 37 of
the EGBGB. Some of the more specific provisions from Rome I were included in laws
that are situated in the various codes of German law.
63 Hein, Germany, supra note 58, at 2102.
64 Id.
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contractual obligations cannot be prejudiced by any choice-of-law
agreement between parties.65 Importantly, German courts “as a
matter of principle” have a duty “to determine the content of
applicable foreign law,” sometimes with the help of court-appointed
experts.66 The possibility to appeal the interpretation of foreign law
in German courts is limited to procedural errors.67
With regard to jurisdiction clauses, German courts also
generally uphold the agreement of the parties where possible.68
Similar to EU law, there are a number of exceptions under which a
German court can refuse to apply foreign law, including a general
public policy exception under Article 6 of the EGBGB.69 At least
one German court has held an exclusive jurisdiction clause will not
be enforceable in cases where there is “reasonable fear” (nahe
liegende Gefahr) that a foreign court would not apply mandatory
German law in certain cases.70
b. Case Examples71
While there is no provision in German law that specifically

EGBGB, supra note 59, at art. 42.
Id.; see also Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [German Civil Procedure Rules], § 293.
67 Hein, Germany, supra note 58, at 2102. “Whereas a failure to apply conflicts rules
correctly justifies an appeal to the Federal Court of Justice, Germany’s highest civil court
has consistently declined to review whether the lower courts have committed an error in
applying foreign law to the case. Rather, an appeal to the Federal Court in such cases
would only be successful if the lower court has failed to establish the content of foreign
law in a correct procedural manner.” Id.
68 See
generally
Dr.
Matthias
Weller,
Auslegung
internationaler
Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen als ausschließlich und Wirkungserstreckung auf die Klage
des anderen Teils gegen den falsus procurator, IPRax 2006, 444-50.
69 The English translation of Article 6 of the EGBGB states, “A provision of the law
of another country shall not be applied where its application would lead to a result which
is manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of German law.” EGBGB,
supra note 59, at art. 6. This translation was taken from the English version of the EGBGB,
supra note 59.
70 See Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Munich, May 17, 2006, 7
U 1781/06, IHR 2006 ¶ 42 (Ger.).
71 Case examples obviously hold less value towards explaining the applicable law in
civil jurisdictions such as Germany than they do in common law jurisdictions like the
United States. This is particularly true given such case law has no precedential or binding
effect on German law or courts. However, when a narrow question such as the one
addressed in this paper is considered, and there is neither a clear guiding statute to answer
such a question nor an adequate amount of scholarship on the issue (the author of this
paper was unable to find any scholarship specifically devoted to this issue in German law),
65
66
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requires it, a review of sample German cases suggests German
courts are likely to apply the law chosen by the parties in a valid
choice-of-law clause to interpret a jurisdiction clause, but are just as
likely to refer to and include German law in their analysis. Two
cases which demonstrate these trends are illustrated here: a 2004
case from the Higher Regional Court of Koblenz and a 2017 case
from the District Court in Munich. Notably, both cases illustrate
the tendency of German courts to refer to German law as somewhat
of a back-up option.
In the 2004 case, the dispute arose from a contract between the
plaintiff and a racing company, which was signed by the defendant
on behalf of the racing company.72 The defendant claimed Germany
did not have jurisdiction over the matter due to an exclusive
jurisdiction clause in the agreement between the plaintiff and Z.F.,
which required all disputes arising out of or in connection with the
contract to be heard by the court where Z.F. was headquartered in
Ohio.73 The choice-of-law clause in the agreement indicated U.S.
case examples are arguably the only source for answering such a research question. In
other words, if one wants to have an idea of how a jurisdiction clause would be interpreted
in Germany, one should turn to examples of situations where such interpretation must
happen in German courts. It is worth noting that any survey of German case examples is
limited by the mere fact that there simply are not many German cases addressing the
narrow issue of this paper. This paper attempts to identify and exemplify trends in German
cases involving the interpretation of jurisdiction clauses despite such limitations.
72 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Koblenz June 24, 2004, 5 U
1353/02 (Ger.). The plaintiff, a professional racecar driver domiciled in Monaco, signed
a contract with a racing company “Z.F. L.L.C.” (“Z.F.”), a U.S. company incorporated in
Delaware and headquartered in Ohio. Under the contract, the plaintiff was to drive in a
race series held in the United States in 2001 in exchange for $300,000. 5 U 1353/02 ¶ 4.
The defendant in the case was the CEO of a German racing team registered as a German
limited liability company which also owned 50% of Z.F. Id. ¶ 3. The defendant signed
the contract with the plaintiff on behalf of Z.F. Id. ¶ 4. Before the race took place, Z.F.
cancelled the contract with the plaintiff, claiming that the defendant did not have the proper
representative authority to enter the contract with the plaintiff on Z.F.’s behalf. Id. at ¶ 8.
The plaintiff then filed a claim against the defendant as the “falsus procurator” (Latin for
unauthorized agent) demanding payment for the $300,000 he would have received had the
defendant not falsely represented Z.F. in the transaction. Id. at ¶ 10.
73 OLG 5 U 1353/02, supra note 72, at ¶¶ 5, 15, 32. The jurisdiction clause in the
case translated to read, “For all disputes arising out of or in connection with this contract
including the termination and the continuing effect of this contract, the responsible court
of the team is agreed upon, provided another jurisdiction is not required by the law.” Id.
at ¶ 5. The German version of the jurisdiction clause stated, “Für alle Streitigkeiten
aus/oder in Zusammenhang mit diesem Vertrag einschließlich der Beendigung und
Fortwirkung nach Beendigung dieses Vertrages wird als Gericht . . . das zuständige
Gericht des Teams vereinbart, soweit nicht aufgrund gesetzlicher Bestimmungen ein
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law governed.74 The plaintiff argued the contract was not valid
given the defendant’s lack of representative authority, and the
jurisdiction clause in the contract would therefore also not be
valid.75 The lower court in the case found it irrelevant whether the
contract was valid because even the effects of an action by an
unauthorized third party with regard to the agreement had to be
decided in the courts designated by the parties in their agreement,
and Germany therefore did not have jurisdiction over the case.76
On appeal, the plaintiff argued the jurisdiction clause was not
valid because substantive U.S. law would not recognize the
prorogation of the Ohio court, or, in other words, enforce the
jurisdiction clause.77 On appeal, the defendant reiterated his
arguments in the lower court, adding that the jurisdiction clause
applied to third parties because even the consequences of the actions
of an unauthorized agent fall within the scope of the agreement.78
On its own initiative, the Senate (a panel of a certain number of
judges in Germany) obtained an expert opinion on U.S. law.79 The
expert opined that, under Ohio law, the jurisdiction clause would be
valid but it was very unlikely that the jurisdiction clause would be
anderer Gerichtsstand zwingend vorgeschrieben ist.” Id. The translation of the forum
selection clause is particularly interesting in this case because the sentence in German “das
zuständige Gericht des Teams,” which translated to “the responsible court of the team”
makes very little sense in English. Even in the German language, the court found that
under the wording of the forum selection clause, the extent and scope of the clause was
not clear because the parties did not choose a specific court in the United States, which
required the court to consider the facts and circumstances of the case. Considering such
facts and circumstances, the court found this clause to mean to suggest the courts selected
were those in Ohio.
74 OLG 5 U 1353/02, supra note 72, at ¶ 6. The choice-of-law clause translated to
read, “[t]he law of the United States applies.” Id. The original German text read, “[e]s
gilt das Recht der Vereinigten Staaten.” Id.
75 Id. at ¶ 18.
76 Id. at ¶ 19; see also Landesgericht [LG] [District Court] Koblenz Aug. 26, 2002,
4 O 404/01 (Ger.). The case does not state whether the lower court applied Ohio law in
the interpretation of the forum selection clause to determine whether, under Ohio law, the
defendant’s action as a third party would fall under the scope of the forum selection clause.
77 OLG 5 U 1353/02, supra note 72, at ¶ 21. The plaintiff further argued that there
was no agreement between him and the defendant, given the defendant acted without
authority, and the liability of an agent acting without authorization is governed by the law
where the power of attorney would have been executed, which in this case was Germany.
Id. at ¶ 22.
78 OLG 5 U 1353/02, supra note 72, at ¶ 27.
79 Id. at ¶ 28.
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applicable against an unauthorized agent as a third party. This is
because under the procedural law of Ohio, jurisdiction clauses do
not apply to third parties other than in narrow exceptions, such as
when contracts are made on behalf of third parties (for example, in
inheritance matters) or when the third party is closely related to the
matter.80 Given the narrow exceptions did not apply in this case, the
expert opined that the claim at issue would not fall within the scope
of the jurisdiction clause under Ohio law. In interpreting the
jurisdiction clause based on the expert’s opinion on Ohio law, the
court indicated the scope of the jurisdiction clause did not include
the plaintiffs claim.81
However, the court went further than the interpretation of the
scope of the jurisdiction clause under Ohio law and found the
jurisdiction clause could not be enforced for separate reasons
grounded solely on enforcement issues.82 It was possible for the
court, based on the interpretation of the clause under Ohio law that
the dispute would not fall within the scope of the clause, to find the
jurisdiction clause should not be enforced. However, the German
court decided the jurisdiction clause should not be enforced for
reasons not directly related to interpretation issues.83 While it made
several references to Ohio law, the court based its decision on
principles of German law.
Id. at ¶ 38.
Id. at ¶ 32-33. Interestingly, the court stated that the issue of whether a jurisdiction
clause applied to a third party under facts such as this where a plaintiff, who did not want
the jurisdiction clause enforced, was suing a third party, was still undecided by German
law and courts.
82 Citing several cases and literature on German law, the court held that the
derogation of a German court cannot be judged independently of the fate of the prorogation
of another court. OLG 5 U 1353/02, supra note 72, at ¶ 36. In other words, the jurisdiction
clause indirectly declares that German courts do not have jurisdiction (derogation of
German courts) because the clause states the courts of Ohio have exclusive jurisdiction
(prorogation of Ohio courts). The court held that a decision based on a jurisdiction clause
indicating German courts do not have jurisdiction cannot be judged independently of
whether the court agreed upon by the parties, in this case an Ohio court, would even accept
jurisdiction at all. In such cases, German courts are required to determine whether or not
the selected foreign court would accept jurisdiction, to ensure the plaintiff has legal
protection and the possibility of having their case heard in a court. Id. at ¶ 37. Based on
the expert opinion on Ohio law, the court found that an Ohio court would not accept
jurisdiction of this dispute because, under Ohio law, Ohio would not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at ¶ 39-51. Further, the court noted that Ohio was also
not likely to hear the case due to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Id. at ¶ 52.
83 Id. at ¶ 53.
80
81
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The second German case example, a recent case before the
district court in Munich, illustrates how a German court, citing to
the universal applicability of the Rome I Regulation, applies foreign
law to the interpretation of a jurisdiction clause even where the
clause points to a non-EU state.84 However, as previously
mentioned and as the below case exhibits, it is not uncommon for
German courts to also analyze the case under German law when
German law reaches the same conclusion.
In this case the plaintiff was a hotel owner in Germany and the
defendant was a website based in the United States which allowed
the public to rate and review hotels.85 The plaintiff hotel entered an
agreement with the defendant in order to be listed on the website.86
This agreement referenced terms and conditions which contained a
combined choice-of-law and jurisdiction clause, stating
Massachusetts law applied to the agreement, and courts in
Massachusetts had exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising out
of or in relation to use of the website.87

Landesgericht [LG] Munich I Aug. 11, 2017, 33 O 8184/16 (Ger.).
Id. at ¶¶ 1-3. The website had other features in addition to rating and reviewing
hotels, such as allowing the public to book trips through the website.
86 LG 33 O 8184/16, supra note 84, at ¶ 4.
87 Id. at ¶ 12. The translated combined choice-of-law and jurisdiction clause states:
“This website is operated by a US-American company and the law of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, USA applies to this Agreement. You hereby consent to the exclusive
substantive and local jurisdiction of the courts in Massachusetts, USA, and acknowledge
the indisputable fairness and reasonableness of proceedings in these courts for all disputes
arising out of or in connection with the use of this website, you agree that all possible
claims you have arising from in connection with or against this website, must be decided
by a court with subject-matter jurisdiction in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The
use of this website is prohibited in a region where any of the provisions of these Terms
and Conditions, including this paragraph, are not legally valid. This does not apply in
circumstances in which the applicable law in your country of residence applies the law of
another jurisdiction and/or another jurisdiction is required which cannot be contractually
excluded.” Id. at ¶ 12. The original German version of the clause stated: “Diese Website
wird von einem US-amerikanischen Unternehmen betrieben und für diese – Vereinbarung
gilt das Recht des Commonwealth of Massachusetts, USA. Sie willigen hiermit in die
ausschließliche sachliche und örtliche Zuständigkeit der Gerichte in Massachusetts, USA,
ein und erkennen die Billigkeit und Angemessenheit von Verfahren in diesen Gerichten
für alle Streitigkeiten aus oder im Zusammenhang mit der Nutzung dieser Website als
unstreitig an, Sie stimmen zu, dass über alle Ansprüche, die Sie möglicherweise aus oder
im Zusammenhang mit dieser Website gegen . . . haben, von einem sachlich zuständigen
Gericht im Commonwealth of Massachusetts entschieden werden muss. Die Nutzung
dieser Website ist in jeder Region unzulässig, in der nicht alle Bestimmungen dieser
Nutzungsbedingungen, unter anderem dieser Absatz, rechtswirksam sind.
Das
84
85
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The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in a Munich
district court after the plaintiff refused to remove certain comments
about the hotel on the website.88 The defendant argued the Munich
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute due to the
exclusive jurisdiction clause in the terms and conditions, which was
valid and enforceable under the German Code of Civil Procedure.89
Citing German case law, the defendant also claimed the
interpretation of the exclusive jurisdiction clause should not be done
by German law but by the law of Massachusetts.90
The Munich court ultimately held it did not have jurisdiction to
hear the case due to the jurisdiction clause.91 In its decision, the
court stated the legal requirements and effects of a jurisdiction
clause, including to whom the clause applies, is to be primarily
determined by the substantive law that governs the agreement. The
determination of which substantive law governs is to be based on
the rules of German Private International Law.92 The court then
cited to Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation to support its opinion
that the agreement was governed by the law chosen by the parties,
which was Massachusetts law.93 The court further found the
exclusive jurisdiction clause to be enforceable and valid under
Massachusetts law, referencing an affidavit from a U.S. attorney
Vorstehende gilt nicht in dem Umfang, in dem das anwendbare Recht im Land Ihres
Wohnsitzes die Anwendung eines anderen Rechts und/oder eine andere Zuständigkeit
erfordert und dies nicht vertraglich ausgeschlossen werden kann.” Id. To sign up for the
website, the plaintiff was required to accept the terms and conditions including the
jurisdiction and choice-of-law clause. Id.
88 In 2016, the plaintiff’s lawyer sent a letter to the website requesting certain
comments about the hotel be deleted because they were untrue and would massively harm
the reputation of the hotel. LG 33 O 8184/16, supra note 84, at ¶ 17. When the website
did not remove the comments, the plaintiff brought suit against the hotel in the district
court in Munich, claiming the Munich court had jurisdiction because the reviews were
visible to the German public, the website used a German domain, communicated with the
customers (such as the hotel) and users of the website in German, and targeted German
consumers and service providers. Id. The plaintiff also argued they would be placed at an
unfair disadvantage by having to sue the defendant in Massachusetts, which is
impermissible under § 307 of the German Civil Code. Id. With regard to the desired
remedy, the plaintiff petitioned the court to require the defendant to remove the reviews
and to pay for damages and attorney fees. Id. at ¶ 15.
89 LG 33 O 8184/16, supra note 84, at ¶ 35.
90 Id. at ¶¶ 35, 41.
91 Id.
92 Id. at ¶¶ 43-44.
93 Id. at ¶ 45.
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submitted by the defendant.94
However, the court took its analysis a step further and stated that
even if it did find that German law applied to the case, the exclusive
jurisdiction clause would still be valid and enforceable under
German law. The parties freely contracted to certain terms and
conditions which did not violate German law, and such terms and
conditions clearly contained an exclusive jurisdiction agreement.95
The court then proceeded to run through a number of the potential
arguments under German law that could render a jurisdiction clause
to be invalid or unenforceable, and found that none of those
arguments applied to that case.96 Hence, regardless of the court’s
analysis of the case under Massachusetts law—which the court did
not discuss in length—the court would have reached the same
conclusion with regard to the enforcement and interpretation of the
jurisdiction clause under German law. As in the 2004 Koblenz case,
the court seemed to use German law as back-up to strengthen its
decision.
2. Austria
Austria is a federal republic consisting of nine federal states
(Bundesländer). Each federal state is divided into districts (Bezirke)
and the districts are divided into municipalities (Gemeinde).97
Courts in Austria are organized on four levels: district courts
(Bezirksgerichte), regional courts (Landesgerichte), higher regional
courts of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte), and the Supreme Court
(Oberster Gerichtshof or OGH).98 Similar to German courts, courts
of the first instance include the district and regional courts
(depending on the value of the claim), the regional courts hear
appeals from the district courts, and the higher regional courts hear
appeals from the lower courts.99 The Supreme Court is the court of

Id. at ¶ 46.
Id. at ¶ 47.
96 Id. at ¶¶ 48-56.
97 THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA FED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE AUSTRIAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 6 (2014),
https://www.justiz.gv.at/web2013/file/8ab4ac8322985dd501229ce2e2d80091.de.0/brosc
huere_oesterr_justiz_en_download.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PJW-NU4S].
98 Id. at 9-10.
99 Id. at 10. District courts in Austria decide claims up to a value of 15,000 Euro. Id.
94
95
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last instance in civil and criminal law cases.100 As Austria is a civil
law system, the case law of the highest court is not binding for lower
courts. However, case law from the Supreme Court is a “major
contributor towards preserving the uniform application of the law”
in Austria, and lower courts are typically guided by such case law.101
a. Summary of Relevant Law
Private international law in Austria is primarily governed by the
International Private Law Act (Bundesgesetz über das international
Privatrecht or “IPRG”), a codified statute adopted in 1978 that
specifically relates to private international law.102 Additional
private international law rules related to specific areas of law, such
as consumer protection, immovable property, and insurance, are
codified in other acts of legislation.103 Under § 53 of the IPRG,
Austria’s domestic private international law rules take a back seat
to any international agreements.104 However, for cases which
cannot be determined based on EU law or under rules from an
international agreement, Austria’s domestic private international
law rules under the IPRG would apply.105
Similar to other private international law structures in European
countries, the IPRG contains typical conflict of law rules which are
divided by specific topics such as the rights of individuals, family
law, property law, and—more relevant to this paper—the law of
obligations or contract law.106 Section 35 of the IPRG governs the
Id.
Id. at 10.
102 Bundesgesetz ueber das international Privatrecht [IPR-Gesetz or IPRG], Federal
Law Gazette 304/1978 [hereinafter IPRG],
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnum
mer=10002426 [https://perma.cc/A4BD-LYU7]. The author of this paper was unable to
locate an English translation of the Austrian IPRG.
103 Applicable Law - Austria, EUR. JUD. NETWORK IN CIV. AND COM. MATTERS (July
3, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/applicable_law/applicable_law_aus_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZVE7-M9B9].
104 IPRG, supra note 102, at § 53(1). Austria is currently a party to only a select
number of international agreements which could have an effect on private international
law rules, including a handful of agreements under the Hague Convention related to issues
such as child support and testamentary dispositions. See Applicable law - Austria, supra
note 103, at ¶¶ 1.2-1.3.
105 IPRG, supra note 102, at § 53(1)
106 The Austrian IPRG is subdivided by sections, or what may be thought of as
chapters (“Abschnitte” in German) relative to these topics, with an additional section at
100
101
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private international rules for contractual obligations.107 In line with
typical private international law rules, Section 35 includes a
provision with the typical conflict of law rules for contractual
matters, which provides that the applicable law to contractual
obligations is the law of the state where the performing party has its
habitual residence or, if the performing party is a company, the law
of the state where the company conducts business related to the
contract.108 However, the third part of Section 35 allows an Austrian
court to apply the law of a different State if it is clear from the
totality of the circumstances that the contractual obligation has an
obvious closer connection with a state other than the state
designated by the conflict of law rule mentioned above.109 Further,
a public policy exception is included in Section 6 of the IPRG.110
Unlike the structure of private international law rules of some
other European nations such as Germany, the Austrian law gives a
clear initial preference to choice-of-law agreements by including
provisions which clearly delineate the relationship of the Rome I
Regulation and Austria’s domestic law on choice-of-law
agreements.111 According to Section 35(1), contractual obligations
that do not fall within the scope of the Rome I Regulation are to be
judged by the law implicitly or explicitly agreed upon by the
parties.112 The Austrian IPRG also contains a unique provision
specifically related to the application of foreign law: Section 3 of
the IPRG translates to read, “[a]uthoritative foreign law is
applicable ex officio and as it is in its original area of application.”113
the beginning for general provisions and a section at the end for final provisions. Germans
are more likely to read an English section (§) symbol as “paragraph” (“Paragraf” in
German) instead of a “section.”
107 IPRG, supra note 102, at § 35.
108 Id. at § 35(2).
109 Id. at § 35(3).
110 Id. at § 6.
111 Id. at § 35(1).
112 Id. at §35(1).
113 IPRG, supra note 102, at § 3. The German version of Section 3 reads, “[i]st
fremdes Recht massgebend, so ist es von Amts wegen und wie in seinem urspruenglichen
Geltungsbereich anzuwenden.” It is worth noting that the word “geltungsbereich,” which
has been translated here to mean “area” of application, can be interpreted to mean area
related to the scope of application or to the jurisdiction. Essentially, under this section,
foreign law is to be applied as it would in the jurisdiction where the law originates from,
which would indirectly include the scope in which the jurisdiction would apply its own
law.
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The ex officio requirement is expanded on in Section 4 of the IPRG,
which states that foreign law is to be determined ex officio, with the
help of expert opinions, assistance from the parties, or information
from the federal ministry of justice if necessary.114 If the content of
foreign law cannot be determined within a reasonable period of
time, Austrian law applies.115
b. Case Examples116
This section includes one Austrian case example that suggests it
is difficult to predict how an Austrian court will handle the
interpretation of a jurisdiction clause. This is due not only to the
limited number of cases available on the issue, but also because the
Supreme Court in the case example was not consistent in the
methods or law it applied to interpret issues within that single case.
Notably, the Supreme Court in this case did the reverse of what
German courts tend to do, and considered the foreign law chosen by
the parties for interpretation issues only as a back-up to other law.
In a 2009 case before the Austrian Supreme Court, the Supreme
Id. at § 4(1).
Id. at § 4(2).
116 Research for Austrian cases was primarily conducted using Lexis Österreich, the
RDB database, and Rechtsinformationsystem des Bundes (RIS). It should be noted that in
general there were simply far fewer Austrian cases available than for other countries
discussed in this paper. This could be because cases for lower courts are not readily
available on the internet. All but one of the many cases reviewed by the author of this
paper related to exceptions to the enforcement of jurisdiction clauses, or demonstrated
when Austrian courts decided not to give regard to jurisdiction clauses due to a public
policy exception or because the case related to, for example, an employment contract or
consumers. Even in late 2017 the Austrian high court was deciding an exception case
related to consumer contracts, which perhaps suggests such exception issues are not yet
settled within Austrian law given the highest court was willing to rule on the legal issue.
See OGH, December 20, 2017, 8 Ob 24/17p, ENTSCHEIDUNG (Austria). In any case, as
mentioned previously, given Austria is a civil law country, case law from Austria is not
binding on Austrian law or courts, and such a limitation should certainly be kept in mind.
All in all, it is not clear exactly why there are fewer cases available related to the
enforcement and/or interpretation of jurisdiction clauses. In the recent December 2017
case before the Austrian Supreme Court, the court held that the lower courts did not have
to interpret general terms and conditions under German law, which was chosen by the
parties through a choice of law clause included in the terms and conditions, where certain
consumer rights are concerned. 8 Ob 24/17p at 3. The court’s reasoning was that under
Austrian consumer protection law, the terms and conditions must be clear and
comprehensible in form, and that an Austrian court interpreting such terms and conditions
based on form should apply Austrian consumer protection law instead of the law chosen
by the parties. Id.
114
115

2018

INTERPRETATION OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

143

Court interpreted a jurisdiction clause partly without citing to any
authority, partly using customary law, and by only citing to the law
chosen by the parties as an alternative basis for its decision.117 The
plaintiff was a ship-owner seated in Switzerland and the defendant
was a company that sold wood with its seat in Austria.118 The
defendant agreed to sell wood to Libya and arranged for the plaintiff
to deliver the wood from Austria to Libya.119 The Bill of Lading
contained a jurisdiction clause, which translated to, “every dispute
that arises from this Bill of Lading, is to be decided in the country
in which the conductor of cargo has its main seat and the law of such
country shall apply, unless otherwise stated in this document.”120 A
dispute arose between the parties when the ship was detained in
Libya because the goods on the ship did not match the description
of the goods in the Bill of Lading.121 The plaintiff sued the
defendant in Austria for damages incurred while attempting to get
its ship released from detainment.122
The plaintiff claimed Austria had jurisdiction under Article 2 of
the Brussels I Regulation, and the jurisdiction clause in the Bill of
Lading did not apply because it was superseded by the Charter
Agreement.123 The plaintiff further argued that Austria had
jurisdiction since all of plaintiff’s claims against the defendant arose
out of the Charter Agreement and not the Bill of Lading.124

OGH, July 8, 2009, 7 Ob 18/09m URTEIL (Austria) [hereinafter 7 Ob 18/09m].
7 Ob 18/09m at 2.
119 Id.
120 The original German version of the jurisdiction clause stated: “Jeder Streitfall, der
sich aus dem vorliegenden Konnossement ergibt, soll in dem Land entschieden werden, in
dem der Frachtführer seinen Hauptgeschäftssitz hat und das Gesetz dieses Landes ist
anzuwenden, es sei denn, es finden sich anderslautende Bestimmungen im vorliegenden
Dokument.” Id. In this case, the conductor of cargo was the plaintiff, who had its main
seat in Switzerland. Neither party disputed that the jurisdiction clause would point to
Swiss courts and Swiss law.
121 Id.
122 Id. The plaintiff was forced by a court in Libya to pay 65,000 Euro in order to be
released from all liability surrounding the issues with the Bill of Lading. The plaintiff also
claimed damages for expenses related to having to stay in Libya pending the outcome of
getting its ship released from detainment.
123 Id.
124 The plaintiff also claimed the Charter Agreement was between the plaintiff, the
Charter company, and the defendant. The defendant disputed this point and argued they
were not party to the Charter Agreement, and the only agreement between them and the
plaintiff was the Bill of Lading. Id. at 3.
117
118
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Moreover, even if looking at the Bill of Lading, plaintiff contended
that the jurisdiction clause in the Bill of Lading was not exclusive,
and jurisdiction should therefore be decided under Article 17
paragraph 4 of the Lugano Convention.125 As mentioned earlier, the
Lugano Convention states if a jurisdiction agreement was concluded
for the benefit of only one party, that party has the right to bring a
claim in another court which has jurisdiction under the Lugano
Convention.126 The defendant argued the jurisdiction clause in the
Bill of Lading was enforceable and Austria therefore did not have
jurisdiction.127 The case ultimately went through the appellate
stages to the Supreme Court.128 The Supreme Court focused on two
interpretive issues: (1) whether the jurisdiction clause was
exclusive, and (2) whether the scope of the jurisdiction clause
covered the damage claims brought by the plaintiff.129
As to the exclusivity issues, the court found the jurisdiction
clause to be exclusive.130 Citing to several secondary sources, as
well as to some German cases, the court first found that for a
jurisdiction agreement to favor only one party as is meant under
Article 17(4) of the Lugano Convention, both parties must have
intended for the agreement to favor only that party.131 Turning to

7 Ob 18/09m, supra note 117.
Lugano Convention, supra note 37, at art. 17. The plaintiff in this case was
headquartered in Switzerland and the defendant was headquartered in Austria, so the
defendant argued having the case litigated in Switzerland was only to the benefit of the
plaintiff. The defendant also argued that liability for any discrepancies between the goods
on the ship and the description of goods in the Bill of Lading rested on the plaintiff, who
should have done their due diligence to ensure the Bill of Lading description matched the
goods that were actually on board the ship.
127 7 Ob 18/09m, supra note 117.
128 The district court (Landesgericht Klagenfurt) disagreed with the defendant and
found that Austria had jurisdiction over the case because the claims brought by the plaintiff
were not within the scope of the Bill of Lading. The higher regional court
(Oberlandesgericht Graz) reversed the decision of the district court. The higher regional
court found that: (1) according to Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation, Swiss law applies
to disputes regarding the Charter Agreement; and (2) in the alternative, the Bill of Lading
also points to Swiss law. Id. at 3–4. The higher regional court also found that the parties
agreed to the Bill of Lading—and thereby the jurisdiction clause—because such contracts
are standard practice and the plaintiff did not object to the jurisdiction clause in the Bill of
Lading, rendering the jurisdiction clause to valid, and Austria therefore did not have
jurisdiction. Id. at 4.
129 Id. at 5.
130 Id.
131 7 Ob 18/09m, supra note 117, at 6. The court also found that one party having its
125
126
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the interpretation of the jurisdiction clause with regard to
exclusivity, without citing to any source, the court interpreted the
jurisdiction clause to be exclusive based solely on its wording.132
The court stated, “[i]n the jurisdiction agreement the word
‘exclusive’ is not used; however, [the jurisdiction clause] includes
‘every dispute’ that arises out of the Bill of Lading, which has the
same meaning.”133 Ultimately, without respect to any choice of law
of the parties, the court held that the jurisdiction clause was
exclusive and the defendant had a right to enforce the jurisdiction
clause despite the defendant being seated in Austria.134
As to the second interpretation question of the scope of the
jurisdiction clause, the court found the damage claims brought by
the plaintiff to be included within the scope of the clause.135 The
courts holding, citing to a decision from the European Court of
Justice, was primarily based on customary practice in international
maritime law.136 However, the court went further to provide
alternative support for its holding on the interpretation of the scope
of the clause based on Swiss law. The court noted Swiss law was
not only the law chosen by the parties, but would also be the
governing law under Austrian private international law rules.137 The
court first went into detail on the basics of Swiss maritime law.138
Citing to Swiss maritime law, the court stated that the terms of the
Bill of Lading are accepted as part of the overall contracting intent
of the parties, and such intent—which would include a jurisdiction
clause—extended to the Charter Agreement unless otherwise
seat in the jurisdiction chosen by the jurisdiction clause is not enough to suggest that party
is being favored under Article 17(4) of the Lugano Convention. Id.
132 Id. at 6.
133 Id. at 5. The original German sentence stated, “In der Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung
wird zwar nicht das Wort ‘ausschließlich’ verwendet, doch ‘soll jeder Streitfall’, der sich
aus dem Konnossement ergibt, davon umfasst sein, was gleichbedeutend ist.”
134 Id. at 7.
135 Id.
136 Id. (citing Rs C-159/97, Transporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA
gegen Hugo Trumpy SpA). According to the court, a Bill of Lading customarily includes
an enforceable jurisdiction clause, which makes the jurisdiction clause by default valid.
Citing to several German commentaries and a few cases, the court then simply stated that
also according to customary practice, the defendant should be able to enforce the
jurisdiction clause for the claims brought against him by the plaintiff.
137 7 Ob 18/09m, supra note 117, at 7.
138 Id. at 7–8. The court also stated Swiss maritime law is similar to German law, and
then went into detail on the basics of German maritime law.
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specified by the parties.139 While the court did not cite to Swiss law
directly related to the interpretation of jurisdiction clauses
generally, the citation to Swiss maritime law arguably achieved the
same effect, as the court decided whether or not the claims brought
by the plaintiff fell within the scope of the jurisdiction clause based
on applicable Swiss maritime law.140
Overall, this 2009 case from the highest court in Austria sends
conflicting messages. On the one hand, the court in this case applied
Swiss maritime law—even if as a back-up to other customary law—
to determine whether or not the scope of a jurisdiction clause in a
Bill of Lading encompassed certain damage claims brought by the
plaintiff.141 On the other hand, the court simply decided that the
wording of the jurisdiction clause established the exclusivity of the
clause, without citing to any authority for such finding or stating
whose law it was applying to make such a determination.142 Given
the court was Austrian, one can assume the court, without stating
otherwise, applied its own law to its interpretation of the wording
of the jurisdiction clause. In any case, the court certainly did not
apply Swiss law to determine whether or not the clause is exclusive,
and was not clear on the overall applicability of the law chosen by
the parties to any interpretation issues.
3. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (U.K.) is a sovereign state divided by three
jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.143
Given only case decisions from England are provided in this paper,
the court system and hierarchy of England and Wales will be
discussed here.144 The courts in England and Wales start at the

Id. at 8.
Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 England and Wales, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN E-JUSTICE (Dec. 12,
2016), https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_judicial_systems_in_member_states-16-ewen.do?member=1 [https://perma.cc/964G-F4JY].
144 For more on the court system and hierarchy in Northern Island, see Judicial
Systems in Member States – Northern Ireland, EUROPEAN E-JUSTICE (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_judicial_systems_in_member_states-16-nien.do?member=1 [https://perma.cc/DS44-MX8T]. For more on the court system and
hierarchy in Scotland, see Judicial Systems in Member States – Scotland, EUROPEAN EJUSTICE (May 7, 2018), https://e139
140
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lower level with county courts, family courts, and magistrate
courts.145 In addition, there is the Crown Court, which hears certain
criminal matters, and a tribunals system, which hears specific types
of matters, including but not limited to issues decided by executive
agencies or tax matters.146 There are three levels of appeal that cases
may reach; first, the High Court—which is made up of three
divisions including the Queen’s Bench, Family, and Chancery
divisions—hears appeals from other courts, and has original
jurisdiction over certain cases.147 The next stage court is the Court
of Appeal, which hears appeals only on issues of law for either
criminal or civil matters.148 Finally, the highest court for England
and Wales is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which also
only takes cases for appeal on important issues of law.149
a. Summary of Relevant Law
As a Member State of the European Union, private international
law in the United Kingdom is currently governed by the EU
legislation already discussed, such as the Brussels Regime and the
Rome I Regulation.150 In addition, private international law rules

justice.europa.eu/content_judicial_systems_in_member_states-16-sc-en.do?member=1
[https://perma.cc/TF6J-TS98].
145 COURTS AND TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, THE STRUCTURE OF THE COURTS,
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/courts-structure-0715.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X8ZG-CSPH].
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Although this EU legislation currently applies to the United Kingdom as a Member
State of the European Union, this of course will not be the case once the United Kingdom
leaves the European Union. The United Kingdom invoked Article 50 of the TEU on 29
March, 2017 and is expected to be withdrawn from the European Union by 29 March,
2019. To ensure a smooth transition, the United Kingdom introduced the European Union
(Withdrawal) Bill to Parliament. The bill essentially incorporates EU legislation into U.K.
law through one large bill which takes care of gaps for the time being, and the U.K.
government would then decide which EU laws it wishes to change over time. The former
bill is now an Act, currently being reviewed for amendments. For updates on the status of
the act, see European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, UK PARLIAMENT (June 26, 2018),
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html
[https://perma.cc/HQ7V-XR85]. At the time, it is unknown how cross-border litigation
and enforcement of judgment issues such as those discussed in the Brussels I and Rome I
Regulations will be handled in the United Kingdom post-Brexit. The U.K. Government
did, however, publish a paper on its intention to continue a cross-border litigation
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come from common law case law doctrine. A number of cases make
up the basic case law that applies to the enforcement and
interpretation of forum selection clauses in the United Kingdom.151
Combined, the cases establish that exclusive jurisdiction clauses are
by default enforceable in the United Kingdom unless the opposing
party can show “strong reason” why the court should not enforce
the clause, and jurisdiction clauses are to be liberally interpreted
unless the clause expressly states otherwise.152
The 2001 Donohue v. Armco Inc. case established the “strong
reasons” test. Under the test, an exclusive jurisdiction clause
pointing to a non-English jurisdiction will by default be enforceable
by an English court if a claim that falls within the scope of the
jurisdiction clause is made in an English court. However, it will not
be enforced if the opposing party can show “strong reasons” for
suing in an English court instead of in the court designated by the
jurisdiction clause.153 Factors related to the convenience of the
parties, which were foreseeable at the time the contract was entered
into, will not be considered by English courts.154 As the High Court
of Justice stated in the Antec International Ltd. v. Biosafety USA Inc
case, “[e]ven if there is an unforeseeable factor or a party can point
to some other reason which, in the interests of justice, points to
another forum, this does not automatically lead to the conclusion
that the court should exercise its discretion to release a party from

cooperation framework with the European Union on 22 August, 2017. See Providing a
Cross-Border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework: A Future Partnership Paper, HM
GOV’T
(2017),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/639271/Providing_a_cross-border_civil_judicial_cooperation_framework.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3HQ-ER8L].
151 These cases include: Donohue v. Armco Inc., [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] Ll Rep 45
(UK); Fiona Trust and Holding Corp. v. Privalov, [2007] EWCA Civ 20, [2007] 2 Ll Rep
267 (UK); and Satyam Comput. Servs. Ltd. v. Upaid Sys. Ltd., [2008] EWCA Civ 487,
[2008] 2 AE (Comm) 465 (UK). See also Black Diamond Offshore Ltd v. Fomento De
Construcciones, [2015] EWHC 1035, 2015 WL 997509, 4 (UK).
152 See Donohue, UKHL, Ll Rep; Fiona Trust and Holding Corp., EWCA Civ, Ll Rep;
and Satyam Comput. Servs. Ltd., EWCA Civ, 2 AE (Comm). See also Black Diamond
Offshore Ltd, EWHC, 2015 WL 997509.
153 Donohue,
UKHL
at
¶
24,
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd011213/dono-1.htm
[https://perma.cc/5T36-W9X2].
154 Antec International Ltd. v. Biosafety USA Inc., [2006] EWHC 47 ¶ 7 (UK).
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its contractual bargain.”155
Under the 2007 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov case,
the English Court of Appeal held jurisdiction clauses in an
international commercial contract should be “liberally
construed.”156 The House of Lords in the same case agreed with the
Court of Appeal and found that liberally interpreting a jurisdiction
clause “promotes legal certainty” and “serves to underline the
golden rule that if the parties wish to have issues as to the validity
of their contract decided by one tribunal and issues as to its meaning
or performance decided by another, they must say so expressly.”157
In the 2008 case Satyam Computer Services Ltd v. Upaid Systems
Ltd, the English Court of Appeal stated: “plainly it makes
commercial sense for a dispute about the validity of the contract to
be determined under an arbitration agreement (or a jurisdiction
agreement). Whether a dispute under a different contract is within
a jurisdiction agreement depends on the intention of the parties as
revealed by the agreement.”158
In the United Kingdom, judges are not required to consider or
apply foreign law ex officio.159 Instead, parties must bring forth
evidence regarding foreign law to support any argument that foreign
law should be applied to an issue, and prove that evidence as a
factual issue in the case.160 Similar to other jurisdictions, experts are
usually brought forth as witnesses by parties making such
arguments.161 Also similar to other jurisdictions, it is not uncommon
for experts on foreign law to disagree.162

Id.
Fiona Trust & Holding Corp., EWCA Civ at 2, 1 C.L.C. at 145. The court went
further to hold: “The words ‘arising out of’ should cover every dispute except a dispute as
to whether there was ever a contract at all. The phrases ‘under’ and ‘out of’ should be
widely construed.” Id.
157 Id. at 562.
158 Satyam Comput. Servs. Ltd. v. Upaid Sys Ltd., [2008] EWCA Civ 487.
159 See Andrew Dickinson, United Kingdom, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2616–17 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See Black Diamond Offshore Ltd. v. Fomento De Construcciones, [2015] EWHC
1035, 2015 WL 997509 (disputing whether or not English jurisdiction was appropriate for
loan notes arising out of both Spain and England).
155
156
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b. Case Examples163
The case examples from the United Kingdom show that English
courts typically acknowledge the application of foreign law, chosen
by the parties in a choice-of-law clause, to the interpretation of
international jurisdiction clauses. However, as seen in the first case
example, English courts limit their application to the consideration
of expert opinions, as opposed to applying foreign law ex officio or
citing the foreign law directly in their decision. Moreover, as
demonstrated by the second case example, some English courts,
while recognizing the applicability of foreign law, will choose not
to apply such law if the court reasons that the applicable foreign law
does not differ significantly from English law.
In Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd v. Wolffkran GmbH, a 2007 case
before the English High Court, the court applied the law chosen by
the parties to govern their relationship to several interpretation
questions regarding jurisdiction clauses in agreements between the
parties. However, the court’s reliance on the foreign law was
limited to expert opinions and the court did not attempt to directly
apply or cite to the foreign law in its decision.164 The claimant in
the case sued the defendant for statutory damages and contribution
related to underlying personal injury claims from a construction
accident where a climbing frame and part of a crane fell to the
ground in London, killing three employees of the claimant and
injuring two others.165 The claims against the defendant were based
on the accusation that the defendant was negligent in the design
and/or manufacture of the climbing frame.166 Two contracts that
governed the relationship between the parties were discussed in the
case: a “contract of hire,” under which the claimant rented certain

163 Research for U.K. cases was conducted using the legal databases Westlaw
International, Westlaw UK, LexisNexis Academic, and JUSTIS.
164 Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd. v. Wolffkran GmbH, [2007] EWHC 857 (TCC),
[2007] I.L.Pr. 43.
165 Id. at 557 (stating that the claimant was an English company engaged in the
business of supplying tower crane equipment and associated labor to construction
companies, and that the defendant was a German structural steel contractor which engaged
in the manufacture of cranes). Id. at 555–57 (explaining that the claimant and defendant
had a close business relationship for many years, as the claimant had purchased many
tower cranes from the defendant and also rented equipment from the defendant and its
subsidiary crane rental business). Id. (stating that the claimant was sued in several
personal injury claims related to the accident).
166 Id. at 557 (bringing the damage and contribution claims under an English statute).
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equipment from the defendant’s subsidiary company (including the
climbing frame); and a sale contract, through which the claimant
purchased the crane and other equipment from the defendant.167
The defendant claimed that the English court did not have
jurisdiction, due to a jurisdiction clause in the general terms of
delivery incorporated into the sale contract, which stated:
These business conditions and all legal relations between the contracting
parties are governed by the law of the Federal Republic of Germany to
the exclusion of the UN purchase law insofar as our general conditions
do not apply. Insofar as the buyer is a qualified merchant, a public
corporate body, or a public separate estate, the Court of Heilbronn is sole
competent for any disputes arising directly or indirectly out of the
contractual relation.168

One of the main issues in the case was whether the claims before
the court were disputes that fell within the scope of the jurisdiction
clause in the sales contract, which included two narrow issues of
interpretation: (1) whether the claimant was a “qualified merchant”
under the clause; and (2) whether the disputes qualified as “disputes
arising directly or indirectly out of the contractual relation.”169 Both
parties had experts on German law. Based on the opinions of these
experts, the court used German law to interpret the clause.170
However, the court notably only mentioned German law as it
pertains to the first issue of interpretation, and did not mention any
German law related to the second interpretation issue.171
The defendant alternatively argued that the contract of hire
incorporated general conditions for hire, which it claimed also
included a jurisdiction clause pointing to courts in Germany.172 This
167 Id. at 556–57 (referring to the climbing frame and crane as part of the accident;
however, the claimant rented or purchased more equipment through these contracts).
168 Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd., at 562.
169 See id. at 558.
170 Id. at 562 (finding that the claimant could be considered a “qualified merchant”
because the defendant’s expert opined that the claimant would be regarded as a “qualified
merchant” under German law and the claimant’s expert did not dispute the proposition).
171 Given the court mentioned its consideration of the experts’ opinions repeatedly
throughout the case, it is possible that the court considered the experts’ opinion on German
law related to the second interpretive issue. The court did not cite to any other authority
in English or other law.
172 Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd., at 565.
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argument was complicated by the fact that the general conditions,
which were supposed to be attached to the contract of hire, were
lost.173 The court ultimately found that the defendant did not meet
its burden to prove the contract of hire included a jurisdiction clause
pointing to German courts.174 Despite its holding, however, the
court engaged in an analysis assuming the contract of hire included
a jurisdiction clause.175 This assumption required the court to
consider another interpretive question: whether the defendant, as a
third party to the contract of hire, could invoke the jurisdiction
clause.176 The defendant argued that it was in fact a party to the
contract because the subsidiary transferred all of its business to the
defendant through a transfer agreement, including the contract of
hire.177 The court examined whether the transfer agreement was
valid under German law and, more specifically, whether a novation
(replacing one party to an agreement with a new party) properly
occurred under German law. A valid novation would make the
defendant the lessor in the contract of hire to the claimant.178 The
court’s discussion of German law was again limited to the expert
opinions and, while the court did little to explain or elaborate on
what those opinions were, it stated repeatedly that its findings were
based on German law.179

173 See id. at 565–66 (showing that the parties presented factual evidence on what
general conditions they claim would have been applied to a contract of hire between the
parties at the time and witnesses from the defendant presented two possible general
conditions, which could have applied to the contract of hire, both of which included a
jurisdiction clause pointing to German counts; however, the court was not convinced that
either of the general conditions could have applied to the contract of hire).
174 Id. (placing the burden on the defendant under EU law to prove that the contract
of hire included a jurisdiction clause, the court found that the “evidence before the court
falls far short of demonstrating that the hire contract . . . included a German jurisdiction
clause.”).
175 See id.
176 Id. at 566 (indicating that the defendant was the parent company of the subsidiary
and, therefore, not a party to the contract of hire between the subsidiary and the claimant).
177 Id. at 566.
178 Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd., at 566–68 (reflecting the court’s discussion in its
analysis of whether or not the claimant was informed and/or consented to the novation,
based on the facts and that German law required the claimant to be informed of the
substitution of parties and to have consented to it).
179 See id. at 566 (“I am not going to embark upon an analysis of German law. Suffice
it to say that I have read the two expert reports and have studied the terms of the transfer
agreement.”).
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The court ultimately decided: (1) the statutory claim against the
defendant was “completely unrelated” to the sale contract, and the
jurisdiction clause incorporated in the sales contract, therefore, did
not apply; and (2) there was no jurisdiction clause in the contract of
hire and, even if there was, the claimant could not invoke such a
jurisdiction clause as a third party.180
The second U.K. case example demonstrates how, despite it
being well-recognized in British courts that the law chosen by the
parties should be applied to interpret forum selection clauses under
the same agreement, a court in the United Kingdom may simply
avoid referring to foreign law even in cases where experts have
presented evidence on the relevant foreign law. In this recent case
before the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court in October 2017,
the court stated that it was “common ground” that a court must apply
the law chosen by the parties in the choice-of-law clause to interpret
the entire agreement, including any potential forum selection clause.
The court subsequently decided instead to examine the clause under
English law based on the argument that interpretation of the clause
under the relevant law chosen by the parties would not produce a
different result than interpretation under English law.181
The narrow issue in the 2017 case, Berrocal v. Warner Chappell
Music Ltd, was whether a provision included in several license
agreements, when construed according to the law of New York—
the law chosen by the parties—would provide exclusive jurisdiction
to the courts of New York over disputes relating to those
agreements. To answer this question, the court had to first
determine “whether the clause is just a choice of law clause . . . , or
whether it is also a forum selection clause.”182 The relevant clause
in this case, which the court referred to as a
“construction/enforcement
clause,”
stated:
“This
[contract/agreement] shall be construed and shall always be subject
to enforcement pursuant to the laws of the state of New York and of

180 See id. at 562–63 (explaining that the court’s decision was based on three reasons:
(1) Both of the claims brought by the plaintiff were related to the defendant’s alleged
negligence; (2) the alleged negligence took place at least two years before the parties
entered the sales contract; and (3) the plaintiff was not bringing a claim that relates to the
breach of the sales contract).
181 See Berrocal v. Warner Chappell Music Ltd, Ref. IP-2017000060, 2017 WL
04393157 (Intell. Prop. Enter. Ct. Oct. 3, 2017).
182 Id.

154

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLIV

the United States of America.”183
Both sides presented opinions from attorneys in New York
regarding how a court in New York would interpret the clause at
issue.184 Interestingly, despite the expert opinions and New York
authorities cited, the court in the case turned immediately to
discussing how the issue would be examined under English law,
based on its view that what matters in such a case is whether the
relevant foreign law is substantively different than English law.185
The court stated:
With great respect to both [experts], I am not at all convinced that the
expert evidence adds anything of substance. In English terms what I
would have to decide is what a reader of the construction/enforcement
clause would reasonably understand the words of that clause to mean. I
did not detect from the evidence of Mr[.] Zakarin or Mr[.] Licalsi that
the New York court would approach construction in a different way. In
any event, I take the view that the responsibility of the parties in a case
such as this is to identify clearly any principle of foreign law on which
they rely which differs from the relevant principle of English law. The
existence of a principle unknown to English law can be either accepted
or disputed by the opposing side and its relevance and effect debated. If,
in the present case, there is no difference between New York and English
law that matters, no expert evidence is needed. Alternatively if the court
is satisfied that differences exist, it is the duty of the court to construe
the relevant clause or agreement with those differences fully in mind.186

In taking this view, the court asked counsel from each side to
identify any differences between New York and English law in
construing the relevant clause.187 The counsel for the defendant
seeking enforcement of the clause claimed New York courts would
interpret the clause more literally than English courts, which the
court did not accept as a difference.188 As a result, the court decided
to “approach the construction of the clause in the usual manner

Id.
See id.
185 See id.
186 Id.
187 Berrocal v. Warner Chappell Music Ltd, Ref. IP-2017000060, 2017 WL
04393157 (Intell. Prop. Enter. Ct. Oct. 3, 2017).
188 Id.
183
184
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under English law.”189
The Berrocal court ultimately decided that the
“construction/enforcement” clause did not constitute a “forum
selection procedure clause” and held that the English court had
jurisdiction.190 Applying the “reasonable reader” test, but without
citing any English law or cases, the court stated, “I do not accept the
words of the construction/enforcement clause would drive a
reasonable reader to interpret them to mean that every conceivable
aspect [of] enforcement must be decided according to New York
law.”191
Confusingly, and despite stating “no expert evidence was
needed” and that the court would apply the English approach, the
court in Berrocal discussed one New York case cited by the
claimant’s expert, Waldorf Ass’ns. Inc. v. Gary J. Nevill, 141
Misc.2d 150 (1998).192 In Waldorf, that court found the clause at
issue, which similarly discussed enforcement, to be solely a choiceof-law provision and to have “nothing to do with choice of forum
or consent to submit to jurisdiction.”193
The court’s opinion in Berrocal is noteworthy, not only because
it is recent and the issue for dismissal was narrow, but also because
it demonstrates how even in English courts, where it is considered
to be settled law and “common ground” that the law chosen by the
parties should be applied to interpret forum selection clauses, judges
in common law courts can apply tests such as the “difference in law”
test to essentially get around having to give weight or cite to the law
chosen by the parties. The Berrocal court was aware of the general
principle that the law chosen by the parties should be applied to the
interpretation of the agreement. It also had several New York cases
put before it by New York attorneys, and even decided to cite to a
New York case that supported its ultimate finding—yet, at the end
of the day, the court based its decision in English law, as opposed

Id.
Id. at *3.
191 Id.
192 See id.
193 See Berrocal, at *3 (citing the New York case, but before applying the English
“reasonable reader” test, the judge in Berrocal stated: “[I]t is always difficult to draw any
firm conclusion on construction from particular words or facts about the cases, and that
difficulty certainly applies in the present case. Therefore, I return to the straightforward
question of construction of the relevant provision.”).
189
190
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to New York law.
III.

Non-EU Countries
A. Civil Law Countries

1. Switzerland194
Switzerland is a Confederation consisting of twenty-six cantons
and half-cantons, which essentially operate as states, and
municipalities, which operate as local authorities within the cantons.
Each canton often has several courts. For example, in the canton
Zurich there are twelve district courts (Bezirksgerichte), a supreme
court (Obergericht), a commercial court (Handelsgericht), an
administrative court (Verwaltungsgericht), a construction court
(Baurekursgericht), a tax court (Steuerrekursgericht), and a social
security court (sozialversichergungsgericht).195
The Federal
Supreme Court (Bundesgericht) is the highest court in Switzerland.
It operates as the court of last instance for appeals against decisions
of the highest cantonal courts, which include the Federal Criminal
Court, the Federal Administrative Court, and the Federal Patent
Court.196
a. Summary of Relevant Private Law
The primary source of private international law rules in
Switzerland comes from the Swiss Private International Law Act
(“Swiss PILA”), which entered into force on January 1, 1989.197
194 Research on Swiss law and cases was primarily conducted using SwissLex and
internet resources publicly available through Swiss governmental organizations or
authorities. Although Switzerland has four national languages, including German, French,
Italian, and Romansh, research for this paper was limited to resources and cases available
in the German language. References to Swiss courts, law, and other authorities will
therefore only be made to the German name for such court, law, or authority.
195 Organisation
[Organization],
GERICHTE ZÜRICH
[Zurich
Courts],
http://www.gerichte-zh.ch/organisation/ [https://perma.cc/97DU-F3QB].
196 Swiss Courts, SCHWEIZERISCHE EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT [Swiss Confederation],
https://www.ch.ch/en/demokratie/federalism/separation-of-powers/switzerlands-courts/
[https://perma.cc/8WRF-6AN3].
197 Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht [Swiss Federal Law on
International
Private
Law],
https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classifiedcompilation/19870312/index.html [https://perma.cc/3PB7-QNAB] [hereinafter Swiss
PILA]. While no official English translation approved or published by the Swiss
Government was located by the author of this paper, there are various English translations
of the Swiss PILA drafted by law firms or legal organizations. Two examples of such
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The Swiss PILA provides rules governing the jurisdiction of Swiss
courts and authorities, as well as the applicable law for international
matters brought in Switzerland.198 Article 5 of the Swiss PILA
recognizes the role of jurisdiction clauses, providing that parties
may agree on a court for existing or future disputes related to a
specific legal relationship.199 Under Article 5, jurisdiction clauses
are presumed to be exclusive unless otherwise stated.200 A
jurisdiction clause may be void if it improperly deprives a party of
jurisdiction they are entitled to under Swiss law.201 Article 9 of the
Swiss PILA, like the Brussels I Regulation, provides lis pendens
rules which require: (1) a Swiss court to stay a proceeding if
litigation has been initiated elsewhere and the Swiss court expects
the foreign court to render a decision regarding jurisdiction within
a reasonable amount of time; and (2) a Swiss court to dismiss the
action before it if a reputable foreign court decides to accept
jurisdiction, and such decision can be recognized in Switzerland.202
Section 3 of the Swiss PILA governs applicable law. Under
Article 116, contracts are to be governed by the law chosen by the
parties.203 Similar to German law, Article 16 of the Swiss PILA
requires Swiss courts, where relevant, to apply foreign law ex officio
or on their own initiative.204 The court may request the assistance
of an expert or, in certain cases, place the burden of proof regarding
the content of foreign law on the parties.205 If the content of the
foreign law cannot be determined, Swiss law will apply.206 There

translations: Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International Law (CPIL), UMBRICHT
ATTORNEYS
AT
LAW,
https://www.hse.ru/data/2012/06/08/1252692468/SwissPIL%20%D0%B2%20%D1%80
%D0%B5%D0%B4.%202007%20(%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB.).pdf
[http://perma.cc/5P6Z-4ZAQ]; Andreas Bucher, Federal Act on Private International
Law,
ANDREAS
BUCHER,
http://www.andreasbucherlaw.ch/images/stories/pil_act_1987_as_from_1_1_2017.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TK4JUWVP].
198 Swiss PILA, supra note 197, at art. 1(a–b).
199 Id. at art. 5(1).
200 Id.
201 Id. at art. 5(2).
202 Id. at art. 5(1,3).
203 Id. at art. 116.
204 Swiss PILA, supra note 197, at art. 16(1).
205 Id.
206 Id. at art. 16(2).
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are some exceptions to when a choice-of-law clause is enforceable.
For example, under Article 120, a choice-of-law clause is prohibited
between parties engaged in consumer contracts.207 Article 17 also
provides an exception to the application of foreign law if it is
incompatible with Swiss public policy.208
International conventions and treaties to which Switzerland is a
party must also be considered in the applicable law; as such,
conventions take precedence over national Swiss law according to
Article 1(2) of the Swiss PILA.209 The most notable of such treaties
is the previously discussed Lugano Convention, which has played a
role in several cases before Swiss courts.210
b. Case Examples211
The following two Swiss cases—both cases from Switzerland’s
highest court, the Bundesgericht, heard in 2012 and 2013
respectively—illustrate how a Swiss court applies the rules from the
Swiss PILA and international conventions such as the Lugano
Convention to address issues regarding the enforcement and
interpretation of jurisdiction clauses. In both cases, the court is
consistent in finding how the law chosen by the parties in a valid
choice-of-law clause should apply to interpretation issues.
The 2012 case illustrates the insistence of Switzerland’s highest
court, based on provisions of the Swiss PILA, that a Swiss court
must apply the law chosen by the parties in a valid choice-of-law
clause to the interpretation of the scope of a jurisdiction clause as it
Id. at art. 120.
Id. at art. 17.
209 Id. at art. 2(1).
210 Because the relevant provisions of the Lugano Convention have already been
discussed under the previous section on EU law, they will not be repeated here. See
Lugano Convention, supra note 38.
211 As with Germany, it should be noted that case examples play only a limited role
in civil law jurisdictions like Switzerland. Due to the strength of its provisions on choiceof-law clauses, Swiss law is more particular in answering the question of which law should
be applied to the interpretation of jurisdiction clauses. However, there still is no provision
under the Swiss PILA that directly links the law designated under a valid choice-of-law
clause to the interpretation of a jurisdiction clause. Moreover, to exemplify how Swiss
courts apply the provisions from the Swiss PILA, the examination of case law is still a
helpful tool. In describing the relevant applicable law in Switzerland, as was the case with
Germany, it should be noted that there are not a significant number of Swiss cases that
address the narrow issue of this paper. However, a survey of the cases that do exist
revealed trends which are demonstrated by the case examples described in this section.
207
208
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relates to third parties.212 The plaintiff in the case, located in
Switzerland, entered a Supply Agreement with “Z,” a Spanish
company, to supply components of a biodiesel manufacturing
facility.213 Z was initially purchasing the components for the
defendant in the case, a company also located in Spain.214 The terms
and conditions of the Supply Agreement included a jurisdiction
clause, which indicated that disputes would be heard in a Swiss
court.215 During the process of the transaction, Z had difficulties
making payment to the plaintiff, so the three parties (the plaintiff,
the defendant, and Z) entered into an Assignment Agreement,
written in English, under which the plaintiff agreed to supply the
defendant with the components it had previously agreed to supply
to Z. The defendant was also required to pay the remaining balance
under the original contract.216 The Assignment Agreement, signed
by all three parties, was to “be governed by, and construed in
accordance with Spanish common law.”217 The Assignment
Agreement also contained a jurisdiction clause under which all
disputes related to the interpretation, validity, fulfillment, and
termination of the agreement were to be heard before the courts of
“S,” located in Spain.218
A dispute arose between the parties regarding the defendant’s
payment, where the plaintiff alleged the defendant did not make full
payment despite the plaintiff having fully performed under the
contract.219 The plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against the defendant
before the Arlesheim district court in Switzerland.220 The defendant

212 Bundesgericht [BGE] [Federal Supreme Court], July 17, 2012, 4A_177/2012
[hereinafter 4A_177/2012] (Switz.).
213 For redaction purposes, Swiss cases often abbreviate party names and other things,
such as cities and locations, in cases by letters. References in this paper to parties or other
names of individuals or places using letters is done only because the court does not actually
give a full name in the case.
214 4A_177/2012, supra note 212, at ¶ A.
215 Id. The redacted opinion does not quote the actual jurisdiction clause and only
summarizes the clause to state the terms and conditions indicated; disputes arising from
the agreement would be heard in “R. ______.” While the case does not make clear exactly
what “R” is, it is clear based on the overall context of the case that R is a Swiss court.
216 Id.
217 Id. at ¶ B.
218 Id. at ¶ A.
219 Id. at ¶ B.
220 4A_177/2012, supra note 212, at ¶ B.
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disputed the Arlesheim court had jurisdiction to hear the matter
given the jurisdiction clause between the parties.221 The Arlesheim
court found that it did have jurisdiction to hear the dispute because
the rights and duties contained in the terms and conditions of the
Supply Agreement applied to the defendant as a third party, and the
heart of the dispute between the parties related to the Supply
Agreement, over which stated Swiss courts had jurisdiction.222
The defendant appealed the holding of the Arlesheim Court to
the Basel Kanton Court (Kantonsgericht Basel-Landschaft) (“Basel
Court”), which, applying Swiss law, reversed the finding of the
Arlesheim Court.223 The plaintiff then applied to the Federal
Supreme Court of Switzerland for relief, requesting the Supreme
Court overturn the decision of the Basel Court and find that the
Arlesheim Court had jurisdiction over the dispute.224 The Supreme
Court addressed the narrow issue of determining which jurisdiction
clause governed the dispute between the parties.225 The plaintiff
argued the Basel Court did not consider the interpretation rules and
commentary (“Auslegungsregeln”) that exists in Article 18 and
thereby violated federal Swiss law.226 The defendant argued that the
interpretation of the Assignment Agreement, including its
jurisdiction clause, was governed by Spanish law—not Swiss law—
based on the choice-of-law clause in the Assignment Agreement,
which both parties agreed to.227
Instead of basing its decision on Article 17 of the Lugano
Id.
Id. (referencing that the Arlesheim court also opined that the jurisdiction clause
from the Assignment Agreement did not render the jurisdiction clause from the Supply
Agreement obsolete).
223 Id. The Basel Court applied Swiss Law, specifically Article 18 of the Swiss Code
of Obligations (das Schweizerische Obligationenrecht or “OR”), which states that
assessments and interpretations of the form and content of contracts should be done
according to the parties’ intent and not according to the text of the contract, which can be
misleading or misused by the parties. Based on Article 18, the Basel Court found that the
parties intended for the jurisdiction clause of the Assignment Agreement to derogate the
jurisdiction clause of the Supply Agreement, and the Arlesheim District court therefore
did not have jurisdiction over the dispute. Id. at ¶ 3.1. The Swiss OR is available at
https://or.gesetzestext.ch/artikel.cfm?key=19&art=Die_Entstehung_der_Obligationen
[https://perma.cc/XAR6-9EF3].
224 Id. at ¶ C.
225 4A_177/2012, supra note 212, at ¶ 3.1.
226 4A_177/2012, supra note 212, at ¶ 3.2.
227 Id. at ¶ 3.2.
221
222
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Convention, the Swiss Supreme Court based its decision on the
principle of lex causae.228 The Supreme Court sent the case back to
the Basel Court, holding that the interpretation of the Assignment
Clause was not to be done by Swiss law, but according to Spanish
law.229 The Supreme Court further advised that, according to Article
16 of the Swiss PILA, the Basel Court can either determine the
content of Spanish law itself or require the parties to submit
evidence regarding the content of Spanish law.230
Turning to the 2013 Swiss case, the plaintiff in that case was a
public company located in Switzerland that provided services in the
airline industry.231 The defendant was a German limited liability
company (GmbH) seated in Germany that provided software.232
The defendant was to provide the plaintiff with software under an
End User License Agreement (“EULA”) and a Master Services
Agreement (“MSA”), but the plaintiff claimed the defendant did not
deliver and install the software as agreed upon.233 The plaintiff
initially filed a lawsuit against the defendant in the Commercial
Court of Zurich.234 The Zurich court held it did not have jurisdiction
over the matter because there was no valid jurisdiction clause, and
private international law rules held jurisdiction would be at the seat
of the defendant in Germany.235 The plaintiff then appealed the
Zurich court’s decision to the Swiss Bundesgericht, or the Federal
Supreme Court of Switzerland.236
On appeal, the parties disagreed as to which jurisdiction clause

228 Lex causae refers to the system of law applicable to the case in dispute. Lex
causae,
OXFORD
REFERENCE,
,http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100103308
[https://perma.cc/MUU9-XM9A] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018). The Supreme Court faced
difficulties because the Lugano Convention was not yet applicable when the parties
entered into the agreement, so the Convention did not apply. 4A_177/2012, supra note
212, at ¶ 3.3.
229 The court cited the Swiss case Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] 128
III 346 E. 3.3 S. 352 (Switz.).
230 4A_177/2012, supra note 212, at ¶ 3.4.
231 Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] July 31, 2013, 4A_149/2013
SWISSLEX ¶ A (Switz.).
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at ¶ B.
235 Id.
236 Id. at ¶ C.
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governed their relationship. The plaintiff claimed a jurisdiction
clause in the supplement to the EULA and the MSA gave
jurisdiction to courts in Zurich. The defendant claimed the clause
in the original EULA, which stated jurisdiction was in Germany,
governed.237 In its decision, the Supreme Court stated the issue of
whether a jurisdiction agreement governed the relationship of the
parties had to be judged “autonomously.” In addition, any
jurisdiction clause must be interpreted using the law chosen by the
parties in their choice-of-law clause, which in this case was German
law.238 Citing to more than ten German cases, the Court held that
according to German law, the dispute must be judged based on the
intent of the parties. The Court further stated it was not certain
under German law that both parties had the intent to change
jurisdiction from Germany to Switzerland, and ultimately rejected
the appeal.239

237 Bundesgericht, at ¶ 3.2. The jurisdiction agreement in the EULA, written in
English, stated, “This Agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with the
laws of Germany, exclusive of its conflicts of law provisions and the Parties hereby submit
to exclusive jurisdiction of the German courts. The Parties hereto expressly waive the
application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods to the terms of this Agreement.” Id. at ¶ 3.2. The clause in the Supplement to the
EULA stated in English “Clause 15 (h) - the existing clause shall be renumbered as clause
15 (i). In addition, the first sentence of this clause shall be replaced by “Venue for this
Agreement will be the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland.” Id. The MSA also stated
jurisdiction was in Zurich in its jurisdiction clause, which stated in English, “This
Agreement, and each Statement of Work entered into in connection herewith, shall be
governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of Germany, exclusive of its
conflict of laws provisions, and the Parties hereby submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the ordinary courts of the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland, in relation to any disputes and
claims arising out of or related to this Agreement. The Parties hereto expressly waive the
application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods to the terms of this Agreement.” Id.
238 Id. at ¶ 4.
239 Id. at ¶¶ 4.1, 5. The court went on to discuss what country would have jurisdiction
under the Lugano Convention, which it also determined to be Germany. Under the Lugano
Convention, given the contracts did not specify a place of delivery, the place of delivery
under the Lugano Convention is at the location of the debtor, in this case the defendant,
and thus jurisdiction would be in Germany. The plaintiff argued the place of delivery was
where the software was to be installed, and jurisdiction would therefore be in Switzerland.
Bundesgericht, at ¶ 5.1. However, the court disagreed, holding that software is not a
physical item and therefore does not have a place of delivery, citing to cases under E.U.
law and the Lugano Convention. Id. at ¶ 5.4.1.
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B. Common Law Countries
1. Australia240
A brief description of the hierarchy of Australian courts is
helpful from the outset. In Australia, the courts are divided between
state courts and federal courts.241 The Local and Magistrate courts
of the states are the lowest courts; they hear minor disputes and
criminal cases before a magistrate.242 The District and County
courts compose the next highest level.243 Cases before these courts
are heard by a judge and typically entail criminal cases and appeals
from the Local and Magistrate courts.244 The Supreme Court is the
highest court in each State or Territory.245 These courts hear very
serious criminal matters and appeals based on law or fact from
lower courts.246 The Supreme Courts may have special divisions
which hear certain cases on appeal, such as a special division for
criminal cases.247 The Federal Courts of Australia hear civil and
criminal matters that fall under federal law.248 Finally, the High
Court in Australia is the highest court in the country. It not only has
original jurisdiction for all matters concerning the Australian
Constitution, but is also the court of last resort for hearing appeals
based on questions of law from the state and territory courts for
criminal and civil cases.249
a. Summary of Relevant Law
Up until 1997, and particularly following the decision of the
Australian High Court in Akai v. People’s Insurance Co., 188 CLR
418 (1996), Australian courts were overall “unsupportive” in their
240 Research on Australian law and cases was primarily conducted using Westlaw
International, the Australasian Legal Information Institute (AustLII), and LexisNexis
Academic.
241 The
courts,
AUSTL.
GOV’T
ATT’Y-GEN.’S
DEP’T,
https://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/Courts/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/KB2V5M2F] [hereinafter The courts].
242 See id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 The courts, supra note 241.
248 Id.
249 Id.
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approach to interpreting and enforcing jurisdiction clauses.250
Courts at the time tended to interpret jurisdiction clauses as meaning
non-exclusive rather than exclusive.251 Even when courts found a
jurisdiction clause to be exclusive, “there was an excessive
inclination to allow factors of convenience to preclude
enforcement” of such clauses, as well as a “willingness to allow
Australian plaintiffs to circumvent such clauses by pleading
breaches of Australian statutes.”252
Since 1997, Australian courts have been more likely to find
jurisdiction clauses to be exclusive in scope than before. The
Supreme Court of New South Wales expressed several guiding
principles for determining whether a jurisdiction clause is exclusive
in Ace Insurance v. Moose Enterprise:253
First, while absence of the word “exclusive” is not determinative, the
distinction between an exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction clause
is sufficiently well-known, and the facility of making the clause
manifestly an exclusive jurisdiction clause so straightforward, that its
absence is not merely neutral but tends against the clause being an
exclusive jurisdiction clause. Secondly, where the courts of the selected
forum would have jurisdiction in any event, that tells in favour of a
clause being an exclusive jurisdiction clause; a fortiori where they would
be the “natural forum.” Thirdly, the suggested exception in respect of
insurance policies is not well supported by the authorities, save that in
the case of ambiguity the court will more readily incline to a construction
that favours the insured. Fourthly, use of words such as “all” or “any”
disputes, and mandatory words such as “shall,” tell in favour of a clause
being an exclusive jurisdiction clause.254

250 Richard Garnett, Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai, (2013) UMelbLRS 6 § I
[hereinafter Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai]. See Richard Garnett, The Enforcement of
Jurisdiction Clauses in Australia, 21 UNSW L.J. 1, 2 (1998).
251 Garnett, Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai, supra note 250, § I.
252 Id.
253 Id. at § II(A)(1) (discussing Ace Ins. Ltd. v. Moose Enter. Ltd. [2009] NSWSC 724
¶ 33 (Austl.)).
254 Ace Ins. v. Moose Enter. [2009] NSWSC 724 ¶ 33 (Austl.). The Ace Insurance
case involved a prorogation clause, which is a clause that designates the courts of the forum
to have jurisdiction. Garnett, Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai, supra note 250, at §
II(A)(1). Australian courts are more likely to find such clauses to be exclusive. See id.
However, the principles identified in Ace Insurance have also been applied to cases with
foreign jurisdiction clauses. See id. at § II(A)(2); AAP Indus. Party Ltd. v Rehau Pte. Ltd.
[2015] NSWSC 468 ¶ 15 (Austl.).
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These principles were taken from English and Australian
cases.255
Where a jurisdiction clause is found to be an exclusive
jurisdiction clause, Australian courts give strong deference to the
agreement between the parties.256 When an exclusive jurisdiction
clause is before the court, “the starting point is that the parties
should be held to their bargain, and while [a] Court retains its
jurisdiction and may decline to grant a stay of proceedings
substantial grounds for doing so are required.”257 To determine
whether such substantial grounds exist, Australian courts follow
four principles that were adopted from English common law. These
principles include: (1) The court is not bound to grant a stay but has
a discretion whether to do so or not; (2) the discretion should be
exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing so is
shown; (3) the burden of proving such a strong cause is on the
plaintiff; and (4) in exercising its discretion the court should take
into account all the circumstances of the particular case.258
Analysis regarding whether a jurisdiction clause should be
enforced “is not to be assimilated to cases where a stay is sought on
the principle of forum non conveniens, nor is it a matter of mere
convenience.”259 Unlike with the issue of exclusivity, it was “well
established” that Australian courts apply the law governing the
contract when interpreting the scope of a jurisdiction clause,
including interpretation of the scope and whether the clause applies
to non-signatories.260
b. Case Examples
Two case examples are provided below. The first case
illustrates how an Australian court applies the law chosen by the
parties to interpret an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The second
case, however, suggests that Australian courts, similar to other
Id. at ¶¶ 15–33.
See id. at ¶¶ 15–40.
257 FAI Gen. Ins. v. Ocean Marine Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n [1997] 41 NSWLR
559, 569 (Austl.).
258 Gonzalez v Agoda Co. Pte. Ltd. [2017] NSWSC 1133 ¶ 34 (Austl.).
259 Glob. Partners Fund v. Babcock & Brown [2010] NSWSC 270 ¶ 118 (Austl.)
(citing English and Australian cases as authority).
260 Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai, supra note 250, at § II(B).
255
256
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common law jurisdictions, are not likely to apply foreign law ex
officio to the interpretation of a forum selection clause.
In Global Partners Fund v. Babcock & Brown, the court, despite
having already decided to dismiss the case on other grounds, went
into an in-depth discussion on the interpretation and application of
the exclusive jurisdiction clause together with the choice-of-law
clause.261 The joint jurisdiction and choice-of-law clause in this case
read:
18.11 Governing Law This Agreement and the rights, obligations and
relationships of the parties hereto under this Agreement and in respect
of the Private Placement Memorandum shall be governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of England and all the parties
irrevocably agree that the courts of England are to have exclusive
jurisdiction to settle any disputes which may arise out of or in connection
with this Agreement or the Private Placement Memorandum or the
acquisition of Commitments, whether or not governed by the laws of
England, and that accordingly any suit, action or proceedings arising out
of or in connection with this Agreement or the Private Placement
Memorandum or the acquisition of Commitments shall be brought in
such courts. The parties hereby waive, to the extent not prohibited by
applicable law, and agree not to assert by way of motion, as a defense or
otherwise, in any such proceeding, any claim that it is not subject
personally to the jurisdiction of such courts, that any such proceeding
brought in such courts is improper or that this Agreement or the Private
Placement Memorandum, or the subject matter hereof or thereof, may
not be enforced in or by such court.262

The parties disagreed about the scope of this exclusive
jurisdiction clause, particularly about whether or not the clause
applied to third parties.263 In discussing its interpretation of the
scope of the clause, the court relied on English case law, noting that
“[t]he proper construction of cl. 18.11 of the Partnership Agreement
261 Glob. Partners Fund, [2010] NSWSC 270 at ¶¶ 97, 117–134. The claimant in the
case was a partnership which, together with other parties, invested in the acquisition of an
indirect equity stake in a company incorporated in Delaware. Id. at ¶ 22. The investment
turned out to be unsuccessful, so the claimant brought claims against the defendant
advisors who handled negotiations for the acquisition, alleging the defendants failed to act
in the claimant’s interests, breaching their fiduciary duty of care. Id. at ¶ 45.
262 Id. at Schedule A ¶ 18.11.
263 Id. at ¶¶ 123, 126.
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is a matter for the proper law of the contract, in this case the law of
England.”264 To support its contention that terms such as “arising
out of” or “in connection with” should be interpreted broadly, the
court cited at length to the previously discussed English case Fiona
Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov.265 The court also cited the
previously discussed English case Donohue v. Armco in support of
its finding that the clause applied to third parties.266
However, despite it being “well established” that the law of the
contract governs the interpretation of exclusive jurisdiction clauses,
similar to courts in the United Kingdom, Australian courts are not
likely to consider foreign law ex officio, or seek out foreign law, if
the parties did not present evidence on such foreign law.267 This is
illustrated by a recent case decided in August 2017, discussed
below.
In Gonzalez v. Agoda Co. the plaintiff filed a personal injury
claim for injuries sustained when she slipped and fell outside of the
shower at a hotel she was staying at in Paris.268 The plaintiff filed a
claim against the company through which she had booked the hotel
online in Australia.269 The defendant, a company incorporated in
Singapore, included standard terms and conditions of booking in
their “Payment Details Page.” The plaintiff was required to agree
to those terms before proceeding with her online booking.270 The
defendant’s terms and conditions included an exclusive jurisdiction
and choice-of-law clause which stated:
The Terms and the provision of our services shall be governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of Singapore without reference to
Singapore conflict of laws rules, and any dispute arising out of the Terms
and our services shall exclusively be submitted to the competent courts

Id. at ¶ 119.
Glob. Partners Fund, at ¶ 120.
266 Id. at ¶ 123.
267 See Gonzalez v Agoda Co.2017] NSWSC 1133 (Austl.).
268 Gonzalez [2017] NSWSC 1133 ¶¶ 6, 18, 24.
269 Id. at ¶¶ 3–16, 24–26.
270 Id. at ¶¶ 4–14. The plaintiff was not required to check any box indicating that she
agreed with the standard terms and conditions. The text, “I Agree with the booking
conditions and general terms by booking this room . . . [,]” appeared above the button with
the text “book now,” which the plaintiff had to click in order to process the booking. Id.
at ¶¶ 13–15.
264
265
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in Singapore. The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act (Cap. 53B) is
expressly excluded and shall not apply to the Terms.271

The plaintiff argued the defendant “was required to exercise due
care and skill in its provision . . . of a hotel room of appropriate
quality” under Australian consumer protection laws.272 The
defendant argued the proceedings in Australia should be stayed or
dismissed due to the exclusive jurisdiction clause.273
The Gonzalez court addressed whether the exclusive jurisdiction
clause was incorporated into the contract.274 Despite the court
stating multiple times that the law of Singapore governed the
contract, the court applied a test from Australian case law that
provides for an objective analysis of the contractual intentions of
the parties. It ultimately determined the exclusive jurisdiction
clause was incorporated into the contract.275 The court discussed at
length the forum non conveniens arguments that were presented by
both parties, and even set forth alternative findings. Despite such a
thorough opinion insisting that the law of Singapore governed the
contract, the court did not discuss or cite a single case from
Singapore to determine whether under Singapore law the exclusive
jurisdiction clause would be incorporated into the contract. There
was also no indication in the opinion that the parties hired experts
or put forth arguments under Singapore law.
2. Canada
Canada, a country made up of ten provinces and three territories,
has three overall levels of government including the municipal,
provincial or territorial, and federal levels.276 The judicial system is
divided between federal and provincial or territorial jurisdictions.277
271 Id. at ¶ 11. Reference to the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) Act refers to a
statute in Singapore. Id. at ¶ 12.
272 Gonzalez, at ¶ 25.
273 Id. at ¶ 35–36.
274 Id. at ¶ 70.
275 Id. at ¶ 118–22.
276 Government,
GOV’T
OF
CAN.
(July
24,
2017),
https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/newimmigrants/learn-about-canada/governement.html [https://perma.cc/Q5GT-62UA].
277 The
Judicial Structure, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 16, 2017),
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/just/07.html
[https://perma.cc/V55Y-MWQX]
[hereinafter The Judicial Structure].
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Each province has its own provincial courts and administrative
tribunals which are responsible for both criminal and civil
matters.278 Furthermore, each province, with the exception of
Nunavut, has three levels of courts, including provincial or
territorial courts, superior courts, and appeal courts.279 The superior
trial courts of a province hear both civil and criminal cases.280 The
Courts of Appeal in each province hear civil and criminal appeals
from the superior trial courts.281 On the federal level, there are three
main lower level civil courts including the Federal Court, which
hears cases involving federal law, the Federal Court of Appeal,
which hears appeals from the Federal Court and other tribunals, and
the Tax Court.282 The Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court
in Canada and, similar to the United States, is made up of nine
justices.283 The role of the Supreme Court is to hear appeals from
the Federal Court of Appeal and the appellate courts in the
provinces and territories, to decide constitutional issues, and to
provide an opinion on important legal questions or issues regarding
“complicated areas of private and public law.”284
a. Summary of Relevant Law
In Canada, forum selection clauses are “generally to be
encouraged by the courts as they create certainty and security in
transaction, derivatives of order and fairness, which are critical
components of private international law.”285 Where there is a forum
selection clause, courts in Canada are to follow the two-step test
(often referred to as the “Pompey test”) outlined by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the 2003 case, Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECULine N.V.286 Under the Pompey test, where no legislation overrides
the forum selection clause, two requirements must be met: (1) the
Id.
Id. (noting the Nunavut court is only made up of the trial level court).
280 Id. (noting such superior courts may go by different names depending on the
province, such as the Supreme Court, the Court of Queen’s Bench, or the Superior Court
of Justice).
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 The Judicial Structure, supra note 277.
284 Id.
285 Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V., 2003 SCC 27, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 450, 463
(Can.).
286 See id.
278
279
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party seeking to stay the action based on enforcement of the forum
selection clause must establish that the clause is valid, clear, and
enforceable, and that it applies to the cause of action; and (2) the
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show “strong cause” why the
forum selection clause should not be enforced.287 Unlike in
European jurisdictions, Canadian courts do not apply a presumption
that forum selection clauses are exclusive unless otherwise
indicated.288
An overall review of Canadian case law indicates that Canadian
courts are not particularly likely to consult foreign law when
interpreting a forum selection clause, regardless of whether it is the
law chosen by the parties to govern their agreement. Canadian
courts are instead more likely to engage in a thorough conflict of
laws analysis, including evaluations under the “real and substantial
connection” test and/or forum non conveniens doctrine. This is so
even in cases where there exists a clearly binding forum selection
clause between the parties. Interestingly, the law in Canada
provides the courts with an immense amount of discretion as to what
type and how deep of an analysis to engage in depending on the
case. When a court is met with a case where the parties have agreed
to a binding forum selection clause, it seems Canadian courts can
choose between or combine several paths in discussing the
enforcement and interpretation of the clause. The courts can include
analyses under statutory factors, common law tests, such as the real
and substantial connection or forum non conveniens tests, or the
court can simply base its decision on the burden of proof under the
strong cause test. The extent to which the courts lean on each of
these options notably varies.
Some provinces in Canada, such as British Columbia, have
enacted statutes to guide jurisdiction issues and to effectively codify
the forum non conveniens test. British Columbia’s statute, the Court
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (“CJPTA”), requires a
287 See Expedition Helicopters Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 2010 ONCA 351, 100 O.R. 3d
241, ¶¶ 6–9 (Can. Ont. C.A.). “The ‘strong cause’ test remains relevant and effective and
no social, moral or economic changes justify . . . departure [from it.]” Z.I. Pompey, 2003
SCC 27 at 463. When necessary, the test “provides sufficient leeway for judges to take
improper motives into consideration in relevant cases and prevent defendants from relying
on forum selection clauses to gain an unfair procedural advantage.” Id.
288 Old N. State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Servs., 1998 CanLII 6512, ¶ 35 (Can. B.C.
C.A.) (“An ambiguous choice of jurisdiction clause will not be construed to grant exclusive
jurisdiction.”).
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court to consider a number of factors in deciding whether to decline
to exercise jurisdiction. These include: (1) “the comparative
convenience and expense for the parties . . . and . . . witnesses[;]”
(2) the applicable law to issues in the proceeding; (3) “the
desirability of avoiding multiplicity of legal proceedings[;]” (4) “the
desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in different courts[;]”
(5) “the enforcement of an eventual judgment[;]” and (6) “the fair
and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole.”289
In describing the role of this statute in relation to cases where a stay
of proceedings is sought based on a forum selection clause between
the parties, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, quoting the
Supreme Court of Canada, stated:
The CJPTA creates a comprehensive regime that applies to all cases
where a stay of proceedings is sought on the ground that the action
should be pursued in a different jurisdiction (forum non conveniens). It
requires that in every case, including cases where a foreign judge has
asserted jurisdiction in parallel proceedings, all the relevant factors listed
in s. 11 be considered in order to determine if a stay of proceedings is
warranted.290

However, “[i]t will not be necessary in all cases to first
determine whether there is territorial competence because it may be
clear that the forum selection clause will govern the outcome of the
matter.”291 Notably, “[t]he existence of a forum selection clause
can, by itself, be sufficient reason for a court to decline jurisdiction,
and it is not simply one of the factors to consider in making a
determination under [section 11].”292
The analysis for a court’s approach to an application for a stay
of proceedings due to a forum selection clause has been
distinguished in some Canadian courts from analysis under the
forum non conveniens doctrine. With regard to this distinction, the
Pompey Court, quoting a law journal article, stated:

289 Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 28, s. 11 (Can.).
The CJPTA was based off the model law drafted by the Uniform Law Conference of
Canada.
290 Preymann v. Ayus Tech. Corp., 2012 BCCA 30, ¶ 29 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
291 Id. at ¶ 33.
292 Id.

172

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLIV

I am not convinced that a unified approach to forum non
conveniens, where a choice of jurisdiction clause constitutes but
one factor to be considered, is preferable . . . I fear that such an
approach would not ‘ensure that full weight is given to the
jurisdiction clause since not only should the clause itself be taken
into account, but also the effect which it has on the factors which
are relevant to the determination of the natural forum. Factors
which may otherwise be decisive may be less so if one takes into
account that the parties agreed in advance to a hearing in a
particular forum and must be deemed to have done so fully aware
of the consequences which that might have on, for example, the
transportation of witnesses and evidence, or compliance with
foreign procedure etc.293

Moreover, if a court concludes strong cause has not been shown
by the party opposing the enforcement of the jurisdiction clause,
then “it is not necessary to consider whether the action has a ‘real
and substantial connection’ to the domestic forum.”294 Hence, as
mentioned previously, Canadian courts have a great deal of
discretion with regard to which tests they want to apply to consider
the enforceability and interpretation of a jurisdiction clause.
b. Case Examples
As previously stated, Canadian courts apply Canadian case law,
instead of any foreign law chosen by the parties in a choice-of-law
clause, to determine both enforcement and interpretation issues
related to forum selection clauses.295 Two case examples are
293

Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V., 2003 SCC 27, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 450, 464

(Can.).
294 6463908 Canada Ltd. (c.o.b. ECL Telecom) v. BellSouth Affiliate Servs. Corp.,
2006 CanLII 40990, ¶ 13 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct.).
295 See Harrowand S.I. v. Dewind Turbines Ltd., 2014 ONSC 2014, ¶101 (Can. Ont.
Super. Ct.) (citing to Canadian case law to find choice-of-law and forum selection
provisions were not binding on the third-party plaintiff and separately that the conveyance
action did not fit within the scope of the choice-of-law and forum clauses). See also
Instrument Concepts-Sensor Software Inc. v. Geokinetics Acquisition Co., 2012 NSSC 62,
¶¶ 30–39 (Can. Sup. Ct. N.S.) (citing solely to Canadian case law despite a Texas choiceof-law clause to find a dispute regarding a settlement agreement between the parties fell
within the scope of a forum selection clause in the original agreement between the parties
which pointed to Texas courts); Preymann, 2012 BCCA at ¶¶ 25–26 (citing to a British
Columbia case instead of applying chosen Austrian law to the interpretation of a disputed
translation of a forum selection clause selecting Austrian courts to determine whether it
was exclusive or mandatory); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 2008
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provided to illustrate this. First, a 2006 case demonstrates a
Canadian court’s citation to Canadian case law, even where the
court found the forum selection clause to be exclusive. A more
recent case from the Canadian Supreme Court then illustrates the
court’s use of Canadian case law to decide on the enforcement of a
forum selection clause and further demonstrates how the highest
court in Canada is currently thinking about such issues.
The 2006 case, 6463908 Canada Ltd. (c.o.b. ECL Telecom) v.
BellSouth Affiliate Services Corp., shows how a Canadian court will
simply apply its own case law to all issues of enforcement or
interpretation of forum selection clauses, even when there is a
choice-of-law clause pointing to the application of foreign law.296
The plaintiff in that case was a Canadian corporation headquartered
in Ontario called ECL Telecom (“ECL”) that provided
telecommunication and personnel services. In November 2005, the
plaintiff entered into a services agreement with the defendant,
BellSouth Affiliate Services Corporation (“BellSouth Affiliate”), to
provide services to repair telecommunications equipment located in
Florida, Georgia, and Alabama that had been damaged by hurricane
weather.297 “Pursuant to a work order from BellSouth Affiliate,
ECL entered into service agreements . . . with 20 technicians and
supervisors (the “Individual Defendants”) to provide services under
its agreement with BellSouth Affiliate.”298
These services
agreements between BellSouth Affiliate and the Individual
Defendants included Confidentiality and Non-Compete
Agreements.299
After two months of working under contract with ECL, the
Individual Defendants resigned from their employment with ECL
and immediately started working for another company, ITC Service

MBQB 112, ¶¶ 45–49 (Can. Man. Q.B.) (citing a case from the Supreme Court of Canada,
as opposed to the chosen English law, to hold a forum selection clause pointing to English
courts did not apply to a third party and further that a contribution claim was an equity
claim and therefore did not fit within the scope of the forum selection clause, and citing to
English law only within a forum non conveniens analysis unrelated to the forum selection
clause); Hayes v. Peer 1 Network Inc., 2007 CanLII 245, ¶¶ 39–50 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct.)
(deciding a forum selection and choice-of-law clause pointing to Washington, USA courts
was non-exclusive based on citing to Canadian case law).
296 See generally 6463908 Canada Ltd. (c.o.b. ECL Telecom), 2006 CanLII 40990.
297 Id. at ¶ 1.
298 Id.
299 Id.
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Group, Inc. (“ITC”). ITC provided similar telecommunication and
personnel services and was also a defendant in the case.300 The
Individual Defendants were still working for BellSouth Affiliate,
albeit through ITC instead of through ECL.301 ECL filed a claim in
Ontario against the Individual Defendants, ITC, BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth Affiliate for “conspiracy
to induce breach of contract and interfere in the contractual relations
between ECL and BellSouth Affiliate and between ECL and the
Individual Defendants.”302 The defendants moved for an order
staying the action “on the basis that Ontario is not the appropriate
forum.”303
The Services Agreement between BellSouth Affiliate and ECL
contained a combined choice-of-law and jurisdiction clause, which
stated:
The laws of the State of Georgia, U.S.A., without regard to its choice of
law provisions, shall govern the validity, construction, interpretation and
performance of this Agreement. Each Party irrevocably agrees that
jurisdiction and venue for any proceedings involving this Agreement
shall be in the appropriate state or federal court in Fulton County,
Georgia, U.S.A. Seller [defined in the preamble to the agreement as
ECL Telecom, an Ontario corporation] hereby irrevocably (a) consents
to the jurisdiction and venue of the courts of the State of Georgia,
U.S.A., including federal and state courts located therein, in any action
arising under or relating to this Agreement, and (b) waives any and all
jurisdictional defenses including, but not limited to, forum non
conveniens that Seller may have to the institution of any such action in
any such court.304

The services agreements between ECL and the Individual
Defendants included a clause which stated, “[t]his Agreement shall
be construed in accordance with the statutes and legal decisions of
the province of Employee’s assignment.”305
Finally, the
Confidentiality and Non-Compete Agreements between ECL and
the Individual Defendants also had a choice-of-law clause which

300
301
302
303
304
305

Id. at ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 2.
6463908 Canada Ltd. Supra note 296 at ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 6 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at ¶ 7 (emphasis omitted).
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stated the agreement “shall be governed and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Florida without regard to
its choice of law provisions.”306
The court first held, citing Pompey, that the forum selection
clause in the services agreement between ECL and Bellsouth
choosing Georgia law and courts enforceable for contract actions.307
With regard to whether the forum selection clause was broad
enough to include related tort claims, the court also cited to
Canadian case law, stating:
If the language of the contractual forum selection clause is sufficiently
broad, extending for example to “any dispute or difference of any kind
in connection with or arising out of the Contract or the carrying out of
the Works [as defined in the contract],” the forum selection clause will
also apply to related tort claims.
308

Based on this Canadian case law and further noting it would be
“incongruous” to require a contract action to be tried in Georgia and
allow tort claims to be tried in Ontario, the court interpreted the
forum selection clause between ECL and Bellsouth to include both
the contract and tort claims before the court.309 In doing so, the court
did not refer to any Georgia law.310
Another case from Canada also demonstrates Canadian courts’
consistency in focusing on its own tests and case law to determine
whether to enforce and how to interpret a forum selection clause. A
case against Facebook in 2017 heard by the Supreme Court of
Canada has gained publicity and raised questions regarding the
enforceability of forum selection clauses in adhesion contracts
where one party is a consumer.311 The plaintiff in the case, a resident
of British Columbia, brought a claim against Facebook, a company

Id. at ¶ 8 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at ¶16.
308 6463908 Canada Ltd., supra note 296 at ¶ 13.
309 Id. at ¶ 18.
310 Id. With regard to the clauses in the service agreements and the confidentiality
and non-compete agreements between ECL and the individual defendants, the court found
that both clauses were choice-of-law clauses and not forum selection clauses, and
considered such clauses only with regard to the “real and substantial connection” test and
the forum non conveniens analysis. Id. at ¶ 19–20.
311 See generally Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751 (Can.).
306
307
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headquartered in California, alleging Facebook “used her name and
likeness without consent for the purposes of advertising, in
contravention to s. 3(2) of [British Columbia’s] Privacy Act.”312
Facebook filed a motion to stay the action based on the enforcement
of a forum selection and choice-of-law clause contained in
Facebook’s terms of use, which each Facebook user must agree to
prior to being permitted to use the website.313 The clause read:
You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) you have
with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook
exclusively in a state or federal court located in Santa Clara County. The
laws of the State of California will govern this Statement, as well as any
claim that might arise between you and us, without regard to conflict of
law provisions. You agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the
courts located in Santa Clara County, California for purpose of litigating
all such claims.314

The Court was split 3-1-3 on the decision, ultimately holding
the forum selection clause was not enforceable because the plaintiff
was able to show strong cause under the second step of the Pompey
test as to why the clause should not be enforced.315 The plaintiff’s
arguments not to enforce the forum selection clause included factors
such as the “convenience of the parties, fairness between the parties
and the interests of justice.”316 The court in the majority opinion did
not cite California law in deciding whether the claim brought by the
plaintiff fell within the scope of the clause, despite Facebook’s
argument that California courts could theoretically apply the law
under the British Columbian or Canadian Privacy Act.317

312 Id. at ¶ 7. The case was also proposed as a class action lawsuit with a request for
class certification being included in the case. Id. The estimated size of the class was 1.8
million people. Id.
313 Id. at ¶¶ 8–9.
314 Id. at ¶ 8.
315 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, supra note 311 at ¶ 76. The concurring justice agreed with
the ultimate finding of the court that the forum selection clause was not enforceable, but
held the opinion that the clause was invalid under the first step of the Pompey test: it was
invalid under the doctrine of unconscionability due to inequality in the bargaining power
between the parties and the inherent unfairness of having a consumer travel to California
to sue a large corporation. Id. at ¶ 112.
316 Id. at ¶¶ 49–50.
317 Id. at ¶ 165. However, it was noted in the dissenting opinion the plaintiff “did not
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By contrast, the dissenting justices opined the forum selection
clause should be held valid and enforceable under the “strong
cause” test. They emphasized strong public policy factors that
supported upholding the agreement between the parties, including
the principles of consistency and predictability in contract
making.318 Notably, the dissenting justices opined the British
Columbia legislature had not used clear language to adopt a
“‘protective model’ limiting the impact of forum selection clauses
in consumer contracts.”319 If the dissenting opinion is correct in its
finding that no consumer exception exists under the Canadian
Privacy Act, then the court arguably should have minimally
interpreted the scope of the clause. However, given that Canadian
courts focus more on enforcement related tests and rarely apply
foreign law directly, it is unsurprising that such an analysis was not
included in the opinion.
3. United States
a. Summary of Relevant Law
Procedurally speaking, U.S. courts often address the
interpretation of a forum selection clause when one party seeks to
dismiss the case based on a forum selection clause in an
agreement.320 The threshold question for the court in such cases is

adduce any evidence of California law or California procedure related to either private
international law or the adjudication of privacy claims. She did not provide evidence of
California law related to territorial jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 166.
318 Id. at ¶ 124.
319 Id. at ¶¶ 143–44. The court compared this to the Code of Quebec, for example,
which had such a clear provision. Id. at ¶ 143. The court stated, “[i]f the legislature had
intended to render forum selection clauses inoperable for claims made under the Privacy
Act, it would have said so expressly.” Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33, supra note
311 at ¶ 144.
320 A motion to dismiss is not the only procedural possibility for attempting to enforce
a forum selection clause in the United States. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held a
forum selection clause can be found to be enforceable through a motion to transfer venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which states “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all
parties have consented.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of
Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 59, 134 S. Ct. 568, 579 (2013). This procedure would, however, be
limited to transfers between federal courts in the United States and would not be applicable
in international cases or in cases where a forum selection clause or a party aim to transfer
the case to a state court. See id. at 59–60, 579-–80. However, dismissal proceedings are
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to decide whether to enforce the forum selection clause and dismiss
the case.321 In deciding whether to enforce a forum selection clause,
U.S. courts typically structure the discussion around the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, which allows the court to dismiss a case if
the forum is inconvenient or another forum is better suited to hear
the case.322 The party seeking dismissal under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens must establish “the existence of an adequate
alternative forum.”323 At the same time, a court is required to give
some deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, with respect to
the general rule that “a plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.”324 Under a traditional forum non conveniens analysis, a
court must balance the relevant public and private interest factors,
which are typically considered along with other arguments, such as
considering the public policy of the forum or general interests of
justice.325
still the primary avenue to address such issues in U.S. courts. As one U.S. district court
put it, “[w]hen the most appropriate forum is abroad, ‘no mechanism provides for transfer
between the courts of different sovereigns’ and, therefore, ‘dismissal under forum non
conveniens remains the appropriate remedy.’’’ My Size, Inc. v. Mizrahi, 193 F.Supp.3d
327, 331 (D. Del. 2016).
321 The court may also phrase this question by asking whether the forum selection
clause is “valid” and/or “enforceable.”
322 For more on the general doctrine forum non conveniens, see generally Edward L.
Barrett Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380 (1947).
323 Mizrahi, 193 F.Supp.3d at 331.
324 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241, 102 S.Ct. 252, 258 (1981). This
rule is based on the idea that a plaintiff should generally be able to litigate in their home
forum, which is ideally the most convenient forum for that plaintiff. However, as the Piper
Aircraft case also noted, the rule has its limits. If a foreign plaintiff is seeking to litigate
outside its home forum, the foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum may be given less deference
and considered to be forum shopping instead. Id. at 256. “Forum shopping” is a term used
to describe individuals who seek to litigate in a certain forum for strategical reasons. For
more on forum shopping, see generally Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum
Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011); Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game,
84 N.C. L. REV. 333 (2006).
325 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 235, 102 S. Ct. at 258. The U.S. Supreme Court
outlined relevant public and private interest factors that should be considered in a forum
non conveniens analysis in the Piper Aircraft case. The private interest factors often
include: (1) relative ease of access to evidence or sources of proof; (2) availability of a
process to compel a party or individual to appear; (3) cost of obtaining the attendance of
an unwilling party; (4) possibility of viewing relevant premises or locations that may be
appropriate to the action; and (5) all other practical problems that make a trial easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive. Id. The public interest factors often include: (1)
administrative difficulties flowing from case congestion in the court; (2) the cost to the
court system of resolving litigation unrelated to a particular forum; (3) the “local interest
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Historically, courts in the United States were weary of enforcing
forum selection clauses, as such clauses were perceived as a
mechanism to prevent an otherwise proper court from hearing a
dispute or to be against public policy.326 The turning point came in
1972 when the United States Supreme Court decided the admiralty
case M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.327 In M/S Bremen, the
Supreme Court held, for the first time, that forum selection clauses
are by default valid and enforceable.328 More specifically, the Court
held that analyses of forum selection clauses under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens require a court to modify the doctrine by
adding a presumption that forum selection clauses are “prima facie
valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the
resisting party to be unreasonable under the circumstances.”329
The Supreme Court’s holding that forum selection clauses are
presumptively valid and enforceable has been upheld and applied in
several cases since 1972.330 Under current U.S. case law, forum

in having localized controversies decided at home;” (4) the interest in having a case in a
forum that is at home with the law which must govern the action; and (5) “the avoidance
of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign laws.” Id.
Courts sometimes add to or modify both the public and private interest factors to better
suit a particular case. See also Bos. Telecomms. Grp., Inc. v. Wood, 588 F.3d 1201, 1211
(9th Cir. 2009).
326 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1913 (1972)
[hereinafter The Bremen].
327 Id. at 1, 92 S. Ct. at 1909.
328 Id. at 15, 92 S. Ct. at 1916.
329 Id. at 10, 92 S. Ct. at 1913. Under the Bremen case, forum selection clauses should
be found unenforceable only when (1) their formation was induced by fraud or
overreaching; (2) the plaintiff effectively would be deprived of its day in court because of
the inconvenience or unfairness of the chosen forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the
chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of such provisions
would contravene a strong public policy. Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148
F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15–18).
330 Such cases include the Supreme Court case Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) and Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for
W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013). In the 2013 Atlantic Marine case,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts conducting a forum non conveniens analysis where
the parties have agreed to a forum selection clause “should not consider arguments about
the parties’ private interests” because, by agreeing to a forum selection clause, parties
“waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for
themselves or their witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.” 571 U.S. at 64, 134 S.
Ct. at 582. A court performing a forum non conveniens analysis should therefore only
consider the public interest factors. Id. “Because [public-interest factors] will rarely defeat
a transfer motion, the practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control except
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selection clauses should be enforced in all but the most exceptional
cases. However, while the Supreme Court has tackled many of the
enforceability issues, no real guidance has been given by the Court
with regard to the interpretation of forum selection clauses.
Consequently, case examples are particularly important for
determining how U.S. courts treat interpretation issues. The case
examples provided below demonstrate that the various U.S. federal
circuit courts approach the issue quite differently, resulting in no
settled U.S. law on the interpretation of forum selection clauses.
b. Case Examples331
How a court in the United States will interpret a forum selection
clause highly depends on which circuit the court interpreting the
clause is situated in. Many courts still limit discussion of forum
selection clauses to an enforceability analysis and do not even
attempt to interpret the wording or meaning of a forum selection
clause, often citing to general conflict of law rules instead. Other
courts recognize the interpretation of forum selection clauses as an
issue separate from enforceability issues. However, as discussed
below, there is a circuit split as to what law governs these
interpretation issues in international contracts that designate foreign
law in their choice-of-law clause.332

in unusual cases.” Id.
331 Research on U.S. cases was primarily conducted using Westlaw and Lexis Nexis.
332 With regard to forum selection clauses, the Ninth Circuit has held that “U.S.
federal common law” applies to interpretation issues. Connex R.R. LLC v. AXA Corp.
Sols. Assurance, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2016). By contrast, the Second and
Tenth Circuits have held that the law chosen by the parties in a valid choice-of-law clause
applies to interpret forum selection clauses. Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211 (2d
Cir. 2014); Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006). However, where the
parties did not brief the applicable foreign law, the second circuit has indicated it may
“apply federal precedent and general contract law as necessary to interpret the meaning
and scope of the forum selection clause.” Donnay USA Ltd. v. Donnay Int’l S.A., 705 F.
App’x 21 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 386 (2d
Cir. 2007)). As noted in the Martinez case, other circuit courts, while not articulating it so
clearly, have also applied the law chosen by the parties in a choice-of-law clause to the
interpretation of a forum selection clause. See Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476
F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying the chosen Illinois law); see also Albemarle Corp.
v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying English law to hold
the forum selection clause was mandatory and exclusive). The Fifth Circuit has taken a
different path, holding the choice-of-law rules of the forum apply to ascertain which body
of substantive law applies to determining the meaning of a forum selection clause
regardless of the presence or absence of a choice-of-law clause. See Weber v. PACT XPP
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After discussing a case example from the Ninth Circuit which
illustrates a court’s application of “U.S. federal common law” to
interpretation issues, this paper will turn to focus on cases where
courts decided that the foreign law chosen by the parties in a valid
choice-of-law clause should apply to interpret a forum selection
clause. These cases demonstrate further discrepancies even
between courts that agree on what law applies.333 Specifically, even
if a court has engaged in the discussion of which law applies to the
interpretation of a forum selection clause, or perhaps even decided,
whether implicitly or explicitly, that foreign law governs the
interpretation, such courts do not always actually apply foreign law
in their interpretation analysis.334 Following the Ninth Circuit case
Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding Texas law applied to determine
whether Texas or German substantive law applied to interpret a forum selection clause
selecting German courts). The Eleventh Circuit has held “general contract principles”
govern the interpretation of a forum selection clause. Slater v. Energy Servs. Grp. Int’l,
Inc., 634 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2011). Finally, in at least one recent case before the
D.C. Circuit, the court has applied “guiding principles” to interpret the scope of a forum
selection clause. See Glycobiosciences, Inc. v. Innocutis Holdings, LLC, 189 F. Supp. 3d
61, 68 (D. D.C. 2016) (applying three guiding principles to decide whether claims “‘arise’
from a contract”).
333 Thinking back to what can be thought of as the three steps of analysis discussed in
the introduction of the paper—namely: (1) enforceability analysis; (2) discussion of which
law governs the interpretation of the clause; and (3) actual interpretation of the clause—
this means that U.S. courts can disagree at any of these three steps. As mentioned
previously, U.S. courts may focus on enforcement issues and not engage in what is
suggested by this paper to be step two or three of the analysis. Moreover, even if a U.S.
court engages in step two and discusses what law applies, that does not mean the court will
engage in step three. Further, whereas a U.S. court is more likely to agree on their holdings
under step one of the analysis due to the previously discussed binding precedent from the
U.S. Supreme Court on the enforcement of forum selection clauses, there is no indication
that U.S. courts will always agree in their holdings under step two or step three regarding
the interpretation of a forum selection clause.
334 Given U.S. courts are scattered across the board with regard to how they handle
the interpretation of forum selection clauses, each and every approach that courts take to
this issue cannot be fully exemplified in this paper. A review of case law from several
jurisdictions suggests that even courts which agree on what law applies often fall into one
of the following categories on this issue: (1) the court states the chosen foreign law should
be applied but then does not discuss the interpretive questions at all and simply skips to
enforceability issues and dismisses on forum non conveniens grounds; (2) the court states
the chosen foreign law applies to interpretation issues but limits the application of foreign
law—often due to the parties not discussing the foreign law in briefing or because the
experts disagree—and decides the case on other grounds; (3) the court states the chosen
foreign law should be applied to interpretation issues but then cites and discusses only U.S.
cases in discussing interpretation issues and thus does not really “apply” the foreign law;
or (4) the court states the chosen foreign law should be applied to interpretation issues and
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example, three examples are provided to highlight some of the main
trends and differing approaches. These include a pivotal Second
Circuit case and two District Court cases which demonstrate
different paths taken by courts that agree the foreign law chosen by
the parties in a valid choice-of-law clause should apply to interpret
a forum selection clause.
Unlike any other circuit, courts in the Ninth Circuit consistently
hold that “U.S. federal common law” applies to interpret forum
selection clauses in international contracts. In Connex R.R. LLC v.
AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance, a 2016 case heard in a California
District Court, the plaintiffs were operators of a commuter train. In
2008, the train had an accident in California which resulted in
injuries to several individuals who later sued the plaintiffs in
personal injury suits.335 The defendant was an insurer of excess
coverage insurance for plaintiffs’ parent company.336 The plaintiffs
filed a claim alleging the defendant fraudulently induced them to
then cites foreign authority or an expert in foreign law. For a case in the first category, see
My Size, Inc. v. Mizrahi, 193 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D. Del. 2016) (deciding to simply dismiss
on forum non conveniens grounds due to differing opinions on the translation of the forum
selection clause). For cases in the second category, see F5 Capital v. RBS Sec. Inc., No.
3:14-CV-1469 (VLB), 2015 WL 5797019 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2015) (applying “general
contract law principles and federal precedent” under the Phillips case instead of English
law because the parties did not cite to English law in their arguments); see also Ujvari v.
1stdibs.com, Inc., No. 16 CIV. 2216 (PGG), 2017 WL 4082309, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13,
2017) (discussing several interpretation issues related to a forum selection clause but
limiting the application of the chosen English law to the interpretation of the scope of the
clause with regard to claims because the parties relied on English law only related to this
specific interpretive issue). For a case in the third category, see Giordano v. UBS, AG,
134 F. Supp. 3d 697, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating Swiss law applied to interpret the forum
selection clause but citing only to U.S. cases for interpretive issues, and only discussing
Swiss law as it pertains to whether a Swiss court would accept jurisdiction). For cases in
the fourth category, see Laspata DeCaro Studio Corp. v. Rimowa GmbH, No. 16 CIV. 934
(LGS), 2017 WL 1906863 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017) (citing to opinions of German experts
to decide whether a forum selection clause was exclusive and whether crossclaims were
included within the scope of the clause); see also MBC Fin. Servs. Ltd. v. Boston Merch.
Fin., Ltd., No. 15-CV-00275 (DAB), 2016 WL 5946709 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2016), aff’d,
704 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing English and British Virgin Island case law to
interpret whether claims fell within the scope of the forum selection clause); see also DBS
Sols. LLC v. Infovista Corp., No. 3:15-CV-03875-M, 2016 WL 3926505 (N.D. Tex. July
21, 2016) (citing to secondary sources on French law to interpret whether the dispute fell
within the scope of the forum selection clause).
335 Connex R.R. LLC, 209 F. Supp. at 1149.
336 Id. The defendants in the case included the insurance company and ten other
defendants, Defendant Does 1-10, who were not discussed in the opinion and therefore
will not be discussed in the case summary provided in this paper.
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settle the personal injury suits by making false statements.337 The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens based on a forum selection clause in the
insurance policy between plaintiffs’ parent company and the
defendant. The policy, written in French and issued in France,
contained a choice-of-law clause and a forum selection clause
pointing to French law and courts.338 The parties disputed whether
the clause applied to the plaintiffs, who were similarly situated
parties but non-signatories to the agreement.339 The court decided
to apply U.S. federal common law to interpret the forum selection
clause and explicitly declined to apply French law.340 The decision
to apply federal common law to the case was outcome determinative
in the motion to dismiss stage of litigation, and led the court to deny
dismissing the case on forum non conveniens grounds. Instead, the
Connex Court held “the public interest factors and the overall
circumstances of the case strongly favor litigation in [California]
rather than in France.”341
By contrast, the Second Circuit—perhaps for the first time for
any U.S. court—clearly distinguished the issues of enforcement and
interpretation of a forum selection clause in Martinez v. Bloomberg
LP.342 In Martinez, that court employed a four-part analysis to
review a district court’s decision to dismiss a claim based on a
337 Id. The alleged false statements included the defendant telling plaintiffs that it
would negotiate with the insurers of the injured individuals and would arbitrate the cases
if necessary.
338 Id. The exact translation of the forum selection clause and choice-of law-clause
was disputed among the parties. Id. In its opinion, the District Court stated the clause
requires “certain disputes arising therefrom to be litigated in France.” Id. (emphasis
added). The defendant AXA, in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion to Dismiss the Action for Forum Non Conveniens, provided the French text of the
clause in a footnote, and claimed the translated clause read: “Any dispute between the
Insured and the Insurer arising from the interpretation of the clauses and conditions of the
contract will be subject only to French Law and will be under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the French Courts, even if a dispute concerns an insured domiciled or headquartered
outside of France.” Defendant AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance’s Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss II(A) ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
339 Connex R.R. LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1150.
340 In doing so, the court stated: “[A]t least one district court has interpreted Ninth
Circuit precedent to mean that district courts sitting in diversity ‘must interpret forumselection clauses under federal common law, without regard to any choice-of-law
provisions in the subject agreement.’ This Court agrees.” Id.
341 Id. at 1149, 1151.
342 Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014).
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forum selection clause.343 The first part of the analysis was a
question of fact and asked whether the forum selection clause was
“reasonably communicated to the party resisting enforcement.”344
The second and third parts of the analysis, the “interpretive
questions,” determine whether the forum selection clause is
mandatory or permissive, and whether the claims and parties
involved in the suit are subject to the forum selection clause.345
Under these first three parts, “[i]f the forum clause was
communicated to the resisting party, has mandatory force and
covers the claims and parties involved in the dispute, it is
presumptively enforceable.”346 The fourth part of the analysis looks
more similar to the typical forum non conveniens analysis.347
In deciding the three questions of law in the four-part analysis,
the Martinez court recognized that courts must know what law to
apply to these questions of law. The court held that U.S. federal law
should apply to the fourth part of the analysis “[t]o ensure that
federal courts account for both the important interests served by
forum selection clauses and the strong public policies that might
require federal courts to override such clauses.”348 However, to
answer the interpretive questions posed by the second and third
parts of the analysis, the court clearly stated the body of law selected
by the parties in an otherwise valid choice-of-law clause should be
applied.349
The issue in dispute in Martinez was whether the plaintiff’s
discrimination claims fit within the scope of the forum selection
clause which applied to disputes “arising under” the plaintiff’s

Id. at 217.
Id. (quoting Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383 (2d Cir. 2007)).
345 Id. The question of whether a forum selection clause is “mandatory or permissive”
is effectively the same as the question of whether or not a forum selection clause is
“exclusive.”
346 Id.
347 Under the fourth part of the analysis, pursuant to the Bremen decision, a party can
overcome the presumption of enforceability of a forum selection clause by “making a
sufficiently strong showing that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or that the
clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.” Id. at 217.
348 Martinez, 740 F.3d at 220.
349 Id. at 218. In its decision, the court reiterated, “[h]ence, if we are called upon to
determine whether a particular forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive, or
whether its scope encompasses the claims or parties involved in a certain suit, we apply
the law contractually selected by the parties.” Id.
343
344
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employment contract.350 The court turned to the law chosen by the
parties to govern the employment contract, English law, to answer
the interpretive question.351 Not only did both parties in the case
cite to English case law in their arguments, but the court discussed
English case law on what seemed to be its own initiative at length.352
The court held under English law the phrase “arising under” “should
be construed to encompass a claim for discrimination based on
perceived disability.”353 After answering this interpretative question
and finding the forum selection clause was mandatory and
reasonably communicated, the court turned to an enforceability
analysis under U.S. federal law and the four-part Bremen test,
ultimately affirming the district court’s decision to dismiss the
case.354
As discussed above, even when U.S. courts decide foreign law
chosen by the parties in a choice-of-law clause applies to
interpreting a forum selection clause, such as the Second Circuit did
in Martinez, courts take various paths to their desired disposition.
The two case examples below demonstrate common issues that
occur in such cases and two of many pathways courts may take.355
In My Size, Inc. v. Mizrahi, a 2016 federal case from Delaware,
the contract in dispute between the parties contained forum
selection and choice-of-law clauses. In addition, the contract was
negotiated and executed in Israel and written in Hebrew.356 The
plaintiff alleged the translated forum selection clause read “[t]he
law which applies to this agreement is the law of the State of Israel
and the place of jurisdiction for the purpose of a jurisdiction clause
is the courts of the district of Tel Aviv-Jaffa.”357 The defendants
Id. at 224.
Id.
352 Id.
353 Martinez, 740 F.3d at 224.
354 Id. at 227–28, 230.
355 For examples of cases that took different approaches, see supra note 334.
356 The plaintiff was a Delaware corporation whose stock was exclusively sold on the
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in Israel. The defendants included individuals and companies
who bought and traded shares of plaintiff’s stock, plaintiff’s former director, a corporation
incorporated in Israel, and individuals residing in Israel. The dispute between the parties
resulted from stock purchases, stock trading transactions, and related investment decisions
by and between the parties related to the plaintiff’s stock. My Size, Inc v. Mizrahi, 193 F.
Supp. 3d 327, 329–30 (D. Del. 2016).
357 Id.
350
351
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alleged the clause translated to read, “[t]he law that shall govern
this agreement is the law of the State of Israel and the place of
jurisdiction for the purpose of a jurisdiction clause is the courts of
the district of Tel Aviv-Jaffa District.”358 Although the court held
Israeli law governed the interpretation of the forum selection clause,
disagreement among experts on each side of the case as to whether
the forum selection clause was mandatory or permissive under
Israeli law led the court to decline to make a determination on the
interpretation issues. Instead, it dismissed the case under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, finding that, based on the private
and public interest factors from the Piper Aircraft case, Israel was
the more appropriate forum.359 The court declined “to make a
determination on the merits of the forum selection clause” because
“the doctrine of forum non conveniens require[d] the case to be
dismissed.”360
In another case, Sberbank of Russia v. Traisman, a district court
in Connecticut was also called upon to address the interpretation
and enforceability of a forum selection clause.361 The plaintiff in
the case was a Russian commercial bank and the defendant was the
alleged owner of a Russian company, Sealand LLC (“Sealand”).362
The defendant executed three personal guaranty agreements in favor
of the plaintiff to secure commercial loans provided to Sealand by
the plaintiff.363 The forum selection clause in the guaranties
indicated disputes were subject to “adjudication in the procedure of

Id.
Id. at 333–36. The experts on both sides of the case were lawyers in Israel. In
dismissing the case, the court stated:
358
359

The Third Circuit has held that applying foreign law is not by itself grounds for
dismissal. However, in a case where there is “such oppression and vexation of a
defendant as to be out of all proportion to the plaintiff’s convenience,” transfer
for forum non conveniens is appropriate. Here, the burden of litigating in
Delaware (including requiring experts or translators to interpret Israeli law)
disproportionately burdens defendants.
Id. at 335–36.
360 Id. at 334.
361 Sberbank of Russ. v. Traisman, No. 3:14cv216 (WWE), 2014 WL 10999674 (D.
Conn. Dec. 14, 2014).
362 Id. at *1.
363 Id.
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the established legislation of the Russian Federation.”364 Two of the
guaranties stated the agreements were “governed by the laws of the
Russian Federation.”365 Citing to the Second Circuit Martinez
decision, the Traisman Court held Russian law applied to
interpreting the meaning and scope of the forum selection clause.366
Both parties submitted expert opinions.367 The court credited the
opinion of the plaintiff’s expert because the defendant’s expert did
not cite to any Russian legal authority to support his opinion that a
non-signatory could enforce a forum selection clause, and found
there was no enforceable exclusive forum selection clause.368 While
the interpretative analysis conducted by the Traisman court was
more thorough than that given by the Mizrahi court, which
explicitly declined to decide based on the applicable foreign law, its
analysis did not seem to add much weight to the court’s decision.
The Traisman court’s decision to ultimately deny the defendant’s
motion to dismiss was based on a three-part analysis determining:
(1) “what deference is owed [to the] plaintiff’s choice of forum;”
(2) “whether the alternative forum proposed by the defendants is
adequate to adjudicate the parties’ dispute;” and (3) assessing the
case under relevant public and private interest factors.369 Hence,
unlike in the Mizrahi case, but using similar tools and a similar path,
the court denied the dismissal.
The above case examples and the U.S. case law discussed in the
previous section regarding enforcement issues encompass the
current U.S. law governing the enforcement and interpretation of
Id.
Id.
366 Id. at *2.
367 Sberbank of Russ., No. 3:14cv216 (WWE), 2014 WL 10999674 at *3. The
defendant’s expert was a Russian lawyer and the plaintiff’s expert was a professor of law
at a Russian University. Id. According to the plaintiff’s expert, Russian courts require a
“high threshold of definiteness for a clause to be recognized as a valid and enforceable
choice-of-court agreement” and the name of the court must be explicitly stated for the
clause to be exclusive. Id. To dispute the opinion of the plaintiff’s expert, the defendant
pointed to a forum selection clause in the credit agreements between Sealand and the
plaintiff, which specifically stated the Commercial Court of the City of Moscow had
jurisdiction, and the defendant’s expert opined the defendant would be considered to be
“closely related” to Sealand, allowing the forum selection clause of the credit agreements
to be enforced despite the plaintiff being a non-signatory. Id.
368 Id.
369 Id. at *2 (citing the public and private interest factors applied in Iragorri v. United
Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71–73 (2d Cir. 2001)).
364
365
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forum selection clauses. As these cases demonstrate, U.S. law
governing this issue is patchwork and rather inconsistent, at best.
IV. Conclusion
When a party seeks to enforce a forum selection clause in a
court, the court has to decide more than whether or not to enforce
the forum selection clause; they also have to decide what that forum
selection clause means, which requires interpretation of the clause.
For example, the court may have to decide whether the forum
selection clause is exclusive, whether it applies in scope to the
claim(s) before the court, or whether the clause applies to third
parties who are not part of the agreement containing the clause.
These interpretative questions are questions of law and therefore
must be answered according to the law of some jurisdiction, but
which one? Put simply, in interpreting forum selection clauses,
whose law is the court applying? This paper has attempted to
answer this question for several of the major English- and Germanspeaking jurisdictions. By comparing the approach on the
enforcement and interpretation of forum selection clauses in
Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia,
Canada, and the United States, this paper has highlighted divisions
between and among civil law and common law jurisdictions, and
between and among Member States of the European Union and
countries not a part of the EU.
The survey results presented in this paper present several
overlapping approaches that the jurisdictions discussed in this
paper, at least, are applying to the enforcement and interpretation of
forum selection clauses. The table below illustrates these
approaches and identifies which countries of those surveyed apply
each approach.370

370 There is, of course, room for argument as to whether or not some of these
approaches are applied in each country or sovereign state. The table is solely based on an
overall analysis from the author of this paper using the relevant case law and case examples
discussed in this paper.

2018

INTERPRETATION OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

Approach
Private international law or
conflict of law rules are
imbedded in national law
(whether statutory or case
law)
Has a separate statute
specifically related to private
international law or conflict
of law rules
Private international law
rules include Lis Pendens
rules
Includes a presumption of
enforceability for forum
selection clauses
Includes a presumption of
exclusivity for forum
selection clauses
Primarily discusses foreign
law from a choice-of-law
clause without relying on
alternative support
Discusses foreign law from a
choice-of-law clause only in
the context of back-up or
alternative support
Applies basic contract
principles to interpret a
forum selection clause
Requires a court to
determine the content of
foreign law ex officio
Requires a court to apply the
content of foreign law ex
officio
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Applicable
Countries/Sovereign States
Germany, United Kingdom,
Australia, Canada, United States

Austria, Switzerland

Germany, Austria, United
Kingdom, Switzerland
Germany, Austria, United
Kingdom, Switzerland,
Australia, Canada, United States
Germany, Austria, United
Kingdom (per EU law),
Switzerland
Switzerland, United States
(some circuits, arguably)
Germany, Austria (somewhat)

United States (some circuits)
Germany, Austria, Switzerland
Austria, Switzerland
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Specifies which law applies
if the court is unable to
determine the content of
foreign law
Relies mostly on expert
opinions on foreign law
Likely to directly cite to
foreign law
Applies a “difference in law”
test
Relies mostly on common
law tests to interpret forum
selection clauses
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Austria, Switzerland

England, United States (some
circuits), Germany
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States (some circuits),
Australia, Canada

As exhibited by the table above, there is no one clear approach
to the enforcement and interpretation of forum selection clauses
among the countries and sovereign states surveyed. There are clear
differences between civil law jurisdictions with specific private
international law statutes and rules which procedurally specify how
courts should handle forum selection clauses, and common law
courts around the world which apply various and sometimes
unpredictable tests. Despite these major divisions, the table above
also demonstrates common ground among the smaller aspects of
each country or sovereign state’s approach to forum selection
clauses. Wherever each jurisdiction surveyed falls within these
approaches, this survey has certainly demonstrated that none of the
jurisdictions share the exact same approach and the enforcement
and interpretation of jurisdiction clauses is therefore uniquely
approached in English- and German-speaking countries.

